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South Africa reformed its company law significantly with the Companies 
Amendment Act in 1999 and introduced a modern approach in relation to the 
share capital with the abolishment of the capital maintenance rule. South Africa 
followed thereby partly the examples of the American Revised Model Business 
Corporation Act, the Canada Business Corporations Act and the New Zealand 
Companies Act. But contrary to the American and New Zealand model South 
Africa retained the share capital accounts, the share capital account in respect of 
par value shares and the stated capital account in respect of no par value 
shares. The striking alteration relative to the abolishment of the capital 
maintenance rule is that a company may now make payments to its shareholders 
out of its capital funds without a reduction of its share capital.  
Switzerland on the other hand is still ruled by capital maintenance principles. 
Every stock corporation must dispose of a minimal share capital when founded 
and may not make payments out of it to its shareholders during its existence 
unless a capital reduction obeying a strict formal procedure has been carried out. 
Furthermore share capital must be divided into par value shares with a minimum 
value of 1 cent each; shares of no par value are not allowed. This formalistic 
approach towards the capital structure has lately been put into question by 
several important law authorities within the country. It has been questioned 
whether this rigid system is really appropriate to meet the actual economic and 
social challenges company law is nowadays confronted with. Even though these 
renowned authors agree that a more flexible structure of the share capital is 
desirable and would render Swiss company law more attractive and competitive 
the proposed reforms are far from being uniform. Different models have been 
discussed from the most advanced proposal closely following the principles of 
the American Revised Model Business Corporation Act to far more moderate 
suggestions concerning basically the introduction of the so called ‘notional no par 
value shares’. The engine behind these discussions is to be seen in the current 
reform ambitions in respect of Swiss Company Law.  
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The company law situation within the member countries of the European Union - 
of which Switzerland is not yet part of - is shaped and constrained by the 
framework provided by European Company Law. As concerns the topic of this 
assignment the Second Company Law Directive of 13 December 1976 is of 
importance as it contains minimum standards in relation to the share capital of 
public companies. It clearly upholds the capital maintenance rule through 
different provisions for example, the prohibition of the issuing of shares at a price 
lower than their nominal value or, where there is no nominal value, their 
‘accountable par’ or the prohibition of advancing funds, making loans or providing 
security with a view to the acquisition of its shares by a third party. There are 
numerous additional provisions throughout the directive which let assume that a 
company’s shares must have either a nominal value or an accountable par. 
There are ambitions within the European Union to simplify the Second Directive 
as part of its on-going deregulatory ‘SLIM’ (Simpler Legislation for the Internal 
Market) initiative. Furthermore a fundamental review of the capital maintenance 
regime is envisaged by the European Commission. These efforts could 
eventually lead to a relaxation of the capital maintenance rule or even to a 
replacement of the present regime.  
In this assignment the current legal situation of South Africa and Switzerland with 
regard to the share capital structure will be examined as well as the movements 
within both countries towards a more flexible capital structure. This will be 
followed by a preview on probable future reform steps. Thereby the 
developments in Switzerland cannot be analyzed completely independent of the 
developments anticipated within the European Union. Finally a valuation will take 
place whether South African Company Law can serve as role model for Swiss 
Company Law and whether the American Revised Model Business Corporation 
Act still provides the basis for further developments in South Africa.  
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1. Legal situation in South Africa 
1.1. The evolution of South African Company Law 
Like other members or former members of the British Commonwealth South 
Africa shares the legal heritage of English company law which it followed most 
closely for more than a century.1 Until the 1960’s the initiative for change in 
matters of company law reform usually came from England and “after reforms 
had been put in place there, other commonwealth countries followed later with 
legislation which was broadly similar”2. The first company legislation in South 
Africa, the Joint Stock Companies Limited Liability Act 23 of 1861 of the Cape 
was almost identical to the English Limited Liability Act 1855.3 Other states and 
colonies within South Africa followed this example and after the Union the first 
South African Companies Act in 1926 was also completely based on its English 
predecessor. Later amendments generally followed the modifications previously 
undertaken in the English company legislation. English case law was therefore 
very important when interpreting the South African Companies Act and was 
treated as ‘persuasive authority’ of great weight4 especially in cases where no 
guidance could be found in South African common law.5 As far as the presently 
interesting capital maintenance rule is concerned, its origin is to be found in 
English common law and was subsequently accepted by South African courts 
with little modification.  
The enquiry into the Companies Act 1926 by the Van Wyk de Vries Commission 
and its reports between 1970 and 1972 eventually brought a new approach to the 
reformation process of South African Company Law. For the first time South 
                                                 
1 JSE Fourie ‘South African Corporate Law Reform - Lessons from abroad’ in JJ Henning/PA 
Delport/MM Katz (eds) Selected Essays on South African Entrepreneurial Law (Bloemfontein: 
University of the Orange Free State Coordinating Research Institute for Corporate Law, 1996) 62. 
2 LS Sealy ‘Corporate Law Reform: The Commonwealth Experience’ in JJ Henning/PA 
Delport/MM Katz (eds) The Future Development of South African Corporate Law (Bloemfontein: 
University of the Orange Free State Coordinating Research Institute for Corporate Law, 1994) 1 
at 2. 
3 JT Pretorius/PA Delport/M Havenga/M Vermaas Hahlo’s South African Company Law through 
cases 6ed (Kenwyn, South Africa: Juta & Co., 1999) 2. 
4 Partnership in Mining Bpk v Federale Mynbou Bpk 1984 (1) SA 175 (T); RC Beuthin / SM Luiz 
Beuthin’s Basic Company Law 2ed (Durban: Butterworths, 1992) 3. 
5 HS Cilliers et al Corporate Law 3ed (Durban: Lexisnexis Butterworths, 2000) para 2.13-2.14. 
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Africa did not simply follow the English precedent but tried to find its own 
solutions where good reasons for doing so could be found. For example the 
Companies Act of 1973 introduced the system of no par value shares which is 
unknown to its English predecessor. It has been said that with the enactment of 
the Companies Act 61 of 1973 South Africa has left the traditional approach and 
effectively cut ‘the umbilical cord’ between English and South African company 
law.6 The continuing separation of these legal systems is due to the differing 
social and economic factors within these two countries.7 On the one hand 
England has become a member country of the EU and is therefore required to 
incorporate the EC Directives on Company Law into their own Company Law. A 
harmonization with continental law systems has therefore taken place and 
consequently an alienation from other common law systems. On the other hand 
South Africa has become a democratic nation with a new Constitution which asks 
for absolute supremacy and which has the potential for being a direct source for 
South African company law.8 Decisions of the higher English courts on 
substantially similar provisions are certainly as well in future to be treated “with 
the utmost respect” and will still have “persuasive force”9 but, it is an undeniable 
and irreversible process in South Africa to rather look to other systems of 
company law which also have their origin in English Company Law but have 
started to pursue their own legal paths already, a long time ago.10  
As such countries which are closely observed in South Africa with regard to their 
company-law developments are to be mentioned the United States, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand. The importance to pursue attentively the significant 
trends within these jurisdictions has been recognized and officially confirmed in 
several press statements by the Standing Advisory Committee on Company Law 
                                                 
6 Pretorius et al (note 3) at 2.  
7 Beuthin/Luiz (note 4) at 4. 
8 MS Blackman ‘Companies’ LAWSA vol 4, Part 1 First Reissue (Durban: Butterworths, 1997) 
para 5. 
9  Blackman (note 8) at para 3; HR Hahlo/E Kahn The South African Legal System and its 
Background (Cape Town: Juta, 1968) 200. 
10 Sealy (note 2) at 2-3. 
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(SAC)11.12 Several areas distinguished by the SAC for the development of 
company law have already undergone significant reforms for example, the capital 
maintenance rule with the introduction of the solvency and liquidity test in its 
place, the related possibility of a company to purchase its own shares and many 
others. Further anticipated developments foremost within the area of share 
capital are to be considered below section 1.6. 
1.2. Capital maintenance rule before 1999 
1.2.1. Origin of the rule 
The capital maintenance rule originated in Great Britain and was established by 
one of the landmark cases of company law, the decision of the House of Lords in 
Trevor v Whitworth13. Lord Watson formulated the famous passage which was 
decisive forthwith for the rules governing the maintenance of share capital by a 
company in common law jurisdictions: “Paid-up capital may be diminished or lost 
in the course of the company’s trading: that is a fact which no legislation can 
prevent; but persons who deal with, and give credit to, a limited company, 
naturally rely upon the fact that the company is trading with a certain amount of 
capital already paid, as well as upon the responsibility of its members for the 
capital remaining at call; and they are entitled to assume that no part of the 
capital which has been paid into the coffers of the company has subsequently 
been paid out, except in the legitimate course of its business.” 
1.2.2. Content of the rule 
The term ‘capital maintenance rule’ is misleading. First the doctrine does not 
require that the value of the shareholders’ contribution of assets to the company 
is preserved in absolute terms nor does it relate to the assets as stated on the 
                                                 
11 The Committee was introduced on recommendation of the van Wyk de Vries Commission. Its 
task is to survey on a continual basis both the Companies Act as well as the Close Corporations 
Act, to make recommendations for the amendment of these Acts and to advise Ministers on such 
matters, cp. Cilliers et al (note 5) at para 2.19.  
12 Cilliers et al (note 5) at para 2.21-2.23. The full text of the press statement of 1985 has been 
published in 1985 (Feb) De Rebus. 
13 (1887) 12 AppCas 409 (HL) 423-424. 
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left hand side of the balance sheet.14 A distribution of assets back to the 
shareholders is only and insofar restricted as it can not be effected out of profits 
available for distribution (i.e. the company’s cumulated net realized profits).  
 
‘Distribution’ may thereby contain a wide range of transactions whereby assets 
are directly or indirectly transferred to shareholders for less than their market 
value.15 ‘Capital’ refers to the issued share capital as can be found on the right 
hand side of the balance sheet. Going concern, a company must therefore not 
necessarily maintain its capital but, it must raise the capital it alleges to raise and 
not return it to its shareholders otherwise than in terms of a formal reduction 
obeying thereby the procedure prescribed in the Companies Act of 1973.16 From 
the principle of capital maintenance a few particular rules have been deducted in 
common law which will be discussed in more detail below: a company may not 
purchase its own shares, it may not pay out dividends out of share capital and it 
may not issue shares at a discount.17 Furthermore a company is not allowed to 
become a member of its holding company.18 In an illustrative interaction between 
statute and common law these rules were in the following, complemented by 
legislation or made subject to statutory exceptions when at the same time 
receiving enhancement and refinement through later decisions by the courts.19
1.2.3. Aim of the rule 
The capital maintenance rule is principally aimed at protecting the creditors.20 As 
held in Ex parte Lebowa21 persons who give credit to the company rely upon the 
issued share capital for payment of their claims. Shareholders should therefore 
                                                 
14 J Armour ‘Share Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a Modern Company Law?’ 
(2000) 63 MLR 355 at 365.  
15 Armour (note 14) at 366. 
16 MS Blackman/RD Jooste/GK Everingham Commentary on the Companies Act Volume 1 
(Wynberg: Juta and Company, 2002) 5_103-5_104; JT Pretorius ‘Capital maintenance doctrine in 
South African Corporate law’ available at 
 (accessed 22 March 2005). www.accaglobal.com/publications/studentaccountant/36856
17 Pretorius ibid. 
18 Blackman/Jooste/Everingham (note 16) at 5_109. 
19 Cilliers et al (note 5) at para 20.02. 
20 Aveling Barford Ltd v Perion Ltd (1989) BCLC 626 633; Blackman/Jooste/Everingham (note 16) 
at 5_105. 
21 Ex Parte Lebowa Development Corporation Ltd 1989 3 SA 71 (T) 101-104. 
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not be allowed to subsequently withdraw their capital investment. Creditors have 
a right to look at the share capital as a fund out of which they are to be paid.22 
Issued share capital has therefore also been characterized as a rigid ‘yardstick’ 
or ‘guarantee fund’ which fixes the minimum value of the net assets that have to 
be available to discharge any claims against the company before it could be 
repaid to the shareholders.23 As already stated in Trevor v Whitworth the risk that 
the capital would be lost in ordinary business activities is one which the creditor 
had to bear and the company is under no legal obligation to recover the loss it 
suffered in the course of the company’s trading.24 But apart from that, issued 
share capital could not be paid out except where a formal reduction of share 
capital had taken place which had normally to be sanctioned by the court.  
Since a reduction of share capital was regarded as being potentially detrimental 
to the interests of the creditors it was strictly regulated in ss 83-90 as originally 
enacted in the Companies Act 1973.25 A company could, if so authorized by its 
articles, reduce its capital by special resolution. According to s 83 the company 
could do so without confirmation of the court provided that the company has no 
creditors or all its creditors had consented to the reduction and the reduction 
affected all its shares or any class of shares proportionately. If these conditions 
were not fulfilled then the general procedure according to s 84 would apply 
whereby the reduction had to take place by way of a special resolution subject to 
the confirmation of the court. If a creditor did object to the reduction then the 
court could dispense with his consent if the company secured the payment of his 
debt [s 85 (3)]. If the court was satisfied that every creditor entitled to object has 
consented to the reduction, or that their debts have been discharged or secured, 
it could make an order confirming the reduction [s 86(2)].  
Although the capital maintenance rule was often referred to as a rule of common 
law for South Africa this is - as the discussed provisions show - not the case. The 
                                                 
22 per Boshoff J in Cohen NO v Segal 1970 (3) SA 702 (W) 705-706; Cilliers et al (note 5) at para 
20.01 et seq.. 
23 Pretorius (note 16). 
24 per Lindley LJ in Verner v Gerneral and Commercial Investment Trust (1894) 2 Ch 239 264-
265 (CA).  
25 Beuthin/Luiz (note 4) at 107. 
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rule was in fact deduced from a proper interpretation of statutory legislation.26 As 
shown, the Companies Act provided for extensive protection for the company’s 
creditors in the case of a reduction of share capital but contained no provision for 
their protection where capital funds were returned to the shareholders without a 
reduction of capital. It could be concluded that the Companies Act indeed 
prohibited such payments.27  
Even though the capital maintenance rule was primarily concerned with the 
protection of the creditors it could as well be construed as protecting 
shareholders from prejudice resulting from a diminishment of the value of their 
shares since directors were not allowed to make further distributions of a 
company’s net assets in case they were less than or equal to the amount of its 
capital accounts.28
In the following it will be dealt with the ‘sub rules’ deducted from the capital 
maintenance rule in more detail following the chronology of their historical 
development. 
1.2.4. Prohibition of dividends out of share capital 
The first ‘sub rule’ which was developed out of the capital maintenance rule was 
the prohibition to pay dividends out of share capital. The principle was first 
explicitly stated in Re Exchange Banking Co (Flitcroft’s Case)29 and later 
confirmed in Guinness v Land Corporation of Ireland30. This prohibition relied on 
the concept of ‘capital fund’ at which creditors have the right to look at for the 
satisfaction of their claims and the use of this fund for the payment of dividends 
would have constituted an unauthorized application of it.31 The Guinness case 
was followed in South Africa in the case Cohen NO v Segal32 where judge 
Boshoff held: 
                                                 
26 Blackman/Jooste/Everingham (note 16) at 5_105. 
27 Verner v General and Commercial Investment Trust (note 24) at 264; Redweaver Investments 
Ltd v Lawrence Field Ltd (1991) 5 ACSR 438 443 SC (NSW). 
28 Pretorius (note 16). 
29 (1882) 21 ChD 519 (CA). 
30 (1882) 22 ChD 349 (CA) 375-376, 379-381. 
31 Pretorius (note 16). 
32 (note 22) at 705-706. 
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“The amount of the share capital and the division thereof into shares of fixed 
amount must also be stated in the memorandum. Such capital is to be devoted to 
the objects of the company. Whatever has been paid by a member cannot be 
returned to him and no part of the corpus of the company can be returned to a 
member so as to take away from the fund to which the creditors have a right to 
look as that out of which they are to be paid. The capital may be spent or lost in 
carrying on the business of the company, but it cannot be reduced except in the 
manner and with the safeguards provided by the statute. … It follows from all this 
that a dividend cannot be declared which has the effect of diverting a portion of 
the corpus of the company to the shareholders. A dividend may thus, generally 
speaking, only be declared out of profits, and a resolution which declares a 
dividend to be paid out of the capital of the company is ultra vires the company.” 
The common law further requested in consistent interpretation of this principle 
that no interest could be paid on shares out of capital.33 To this principle there 
was a statutory exception introduced in s 79 of the Companies Act where shares 
were issued in order to finance construction works or the acquisition of a plant 
which could not produce profits for a lengthy period. 
1.2.5. Prohibition of a repurchase by a company of its own shares 
The rule according to which a company was not allowed to buy back its own 
shares was also stated in Trevor v Whitworth34 by Lord MacNaghton and was 
henceforth known as the English Rule35: “The third point is one of general 
importance. It raises the question whether it is competent for a company…, on 
the principle of limited liability, to purchase its own shares when it is autorised by 
its articles to do so. The consideration of that question, as it appears to me, 
necessarily involves the broader question whether it is competent for a limited 
company under any circumstances to invest any portion of its capital in the 
purchase of a share of its own capital stock, or to return any portion of its capital 
                                                 
33 Cilliers et al (note 5) at para 20.07. 
34 (note 13). 
35 As opposed to the American Rule which was expressed more than fifty years before the 
English rule and held that a corporation could purchase its own shares subject to certain 
limitations; cp. A Trichardt/K Organ/J Cilliers ‘The Purchase by a Company of its Own Shares’ 10 
Transactions of the Centre for Business Law UOFS (1989) 16. 
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to any shareholder without following the course which Parliament has prescribed 
… they cannot draw on a fund in which others as well as themselves are 
interested. That, I think, is the law, and that is the good sense of the matter.”36
The rule was followed in South Africa. It was held by J Coetzee in The Unisec 
Group Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd, that “Since the earliest days of company law it 
has been firmly recognized that a company cannot buy its own shares for the 
reasons set forth by Lord HERSCHELL in Trevor v Whitworth (1887) 12 AC 409 
(HL) at 416 … The illegality and voidness of such a purchase actually came to be 
regarded as part of the common law and is so treated in a number of judgements 
and by text book writers. The prohibition against such acquisition was not even 
expressly contained in any of the company statutes until some 50 years ago. So 
fundamental is this principle. Our 1926 Companies Act, which followed the 
English Companies Act very closely, did not contain any provision expressly 
prohibiting such purchases and moreover contained no provisions at all relating 
to subsidiary or holding companies. The employment of a company’s fund in the 
purchase or, in loans upon security of the company’s shares, was usually dealt 
with only in the articles but was illegal even in absence of such a prohibiting 
article. … This is some indication of how firmly the law has at all times set its face 
against such activities.”37
A company could therefore not purchase its own shares even though expressly 
empowered to do so by its memorandum or articles of association. Such a 
purchase was considered as void and illegal.38 The precautions contained in the 
capital reduction provisions aimed at the protection of creditors would have made 
little sense if a company could simply reduce its capital by a repurchase of its 
shares.  
Furthermore it was considered that trafficking of a company in its own shares 
could prejudice certain shareholders, especially minority shareholders.39 
Directors might have used a share buy-back to maintain themselves in control, to 
                                                 
36 Trevor v Whitworth (note 13) at 432, 436. 
37 1986 (3) SA 259 (T) 264-265; see also Sage Holdings Ltd v The Unisec Group Ltd 1982 (1) SA 
337 (W) 347-349. 
38 Blackman/Jooste/Everingham (note 16) at 5_41. 
39 Trichardt/Organ/Cilliers (note 35) at 98. 
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manipulate voting power or to buy out inconvenient shareholders.40 There would 
have been no safeguard that the shareholders are treated equitable. Depending 
on the share prize paid, either the remaining or the exiting shareholders could be 
favored: if a company pays more than the market value of the shares it dilutes 
the value of the remainder, if it pays too little it increases the value of the 
remainder and therefore discriminates the selling shareholders.41 Trafficking in 
its own shares was therefore considered as being ‘ultra vires’ the company.42  
In order to reinforce the prohibition of buying back its shares a company could 
furthermore not purchase43 its own shares through a subsidiary or nominee 
company and it could not give financial assistance for the purchase of shares in 
itself or a holding company.44  
There were however certain exceptions to the general prohibition of buy-backs: 
• a company could redeem redeemable preference shares under s 98 of the 
Companies Act whereby funds of a fresh issue of shares or profits which 
would otherwise be available for dividends had to be used; 
• a company could be obliged by a court order to repurchase some of its 
shares by s 252(3) of the Companies Act in case of an oppressive or 
unfairly prejudicial conduct of it against a shareholder; 
• according to certain Acts for example, the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979 a 
company in terms of s 53(b) of the Companies Act could repurchase its 
shares because the directors of such companies are - together with the 
company - jointly and severally liable for its debts.  
1.2.6. No issue of shares at a discount 
The final sub rule to be developed by courts as an extended interpretation of the 
capital maintenance rule was the prohibition that shares could be issued at a 
discount. The rule, established in Ooregum Gold Mining Co of India Ltd v 
                                                 
40 Trichardt/Organ/Cilliers (note 35) at 10. 
41 LCB Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 3ed (London: Stevens & Sons, 1969) 112. 
42 Trichardt/Organ/Cilliers (note 35) 11. 
43 Any allotment, issue or transfer of shares of a company to its subsidiary was void. 
44 Cp. ss 38 and 39 in their original wording; Sage Holdings Ltd v Unisec Group Ltd 1982 (1) SA 
337 (W) 348-349; Blackman/Jooste/Everingham (note 16) at 5_41. 
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Roper45, was also based on the concept of ‘capital fund’ on which creditors may 
rely on. In certain circumstances the issue at a discount is possible according to 
a statutory exception. In the case of the issue of shares of par value at a discount 
s 81 of the Companies Act requires thereby the sanction by the court as well as a 
special resolution by the company whereby the court has a wide discretion 
whether or not to allow such an issue having regard to all the circumstances of 
the case. This discretion enables the court to protect the interests of the creditors 
as well as the interests of the minority shareholders. In relation to the issue of 
shares of no par value s 82 of the Companies Act requires only a special 
resolution by the company.  
1.2.7. No financial assistance by a company for the purchase of its 
shares 
This prohibition unlike the three other sub rules mentioned above was not 
developed in common law but was directly introduced as a statutory provision. As 
usual at that time, the problem was first perceived in England. According to the 
Greene Committee46 the typical situation experienced in practice was that a 
syndicate agreed to purchase from the existing shareholders sufficient shares to 
control a company and the therefore necessary money was indirectly provided 
out of the company’s fund. This was considered to be a circumvention of the 
principle that a company was not allowed to traffic in its own shares. The Greene 
Committee therefore recommended a statutory prohibition whereby a company 
was prohibited from providing any financial assistance in connection with the 
purchase of their own shares by third persons, whether this assistance was 
granted in form of a loan, a guarantee, a security or by other means. Exceptions 
to this rule were allowed where the lending of money was part of the company’s 
ordinary business or where it was for a scheme to enable employees to purchase 
or benefit from shares.  
                                                 
45 (1892) AC 125 (HL) 133 and 145. 
46 Great Britain Company Law Amendment Committee Greene Report 1925-26 (London: 
H.M.S.O., 1926) para 30; Cilliers et al (note 5) at para 20.16. 
 14
However in 1962 the Jenkins Committee47 had its doubt whether the financial 
assistance by a company for the acquisition of its shares really offended the rule 
that a company may not buy its own shares since it did not necessarily involve 
the reduction of the share capital. If the borrower was able for example, to repay 
the loan then the company’s capital remained intact. The justification of the 
prohibition was rather perceived in the illegitimate risk at the expense of the 
creditors and minority shareholders which occurred due to the fact that people 
acquired control of the company by not providing themselves the necessary 
funds to acquire the shares but rather relied for this object on the funds of the 
company itself. If the risk of loss materialized then the creditors and minority 
shareholders would be left with nothing more than a claim against the directors 
for abuse of their power. Therefore s 54 of the English Companies Act was 
retained.  
The statutory extension no financial assistance by a company for the purchase of 
its shares of the capital maintenance rule was embraced in South Africa in its 
widest sense with the enactment of s 3848 of the Companies Act. The motivation 
was to ensure that the acquisition of shares is done from the own resources of 
the acquirer and to prevent the exposure to a possible risk of the company’s fund 
as well as the unauthorized reduction of share capital in certain cases.49 The 
exceptions to this rule are the same as were provided for in English legislation 
mentioned above.  
1.2.8. Criticism on the rule 
The capital maintenance rule has been criticized in almost every common law 
country where it first applied based on the principles developed in English 
company law. It has been a general perception that the doctrine constitutes an 
                                                 
47 Board of Trade, Company Law Committee Report of the Company Law Committee (Jenkins 
Report) 1961-62 (London: H.M.S.O., 1962) para 172-173. 
48 S 38 (1) “No company shall give, whether directly or indirectly, and whether by means of a 
loan, guarantee, the provision of security or otherwise, any financial assistance for the purpose of 
or in connection with a purchase or subscription made or to be made by any person of or for any 
shares of the company, or where the company is a subsidiary company, of its holding company.” 
49 Pretorius (note 16). 
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imperfect way to protect creditors.50 In South Africa the sense of the rule and its 
sub rules was questioned facing the fact that the South African Companies Act 
never required a minimum capital amount neither for public nor for private 
companies.51 The English company does prescribe a minimum capital complying 
thereby with the Second EU Company Law Directive of 13 December 1976. In 
South Africa it has been held that the minimum capital requirements did in any 
event not correlate with the capital maintenance rule since the rule would do no 
more than protecting creditors in their trust to the capital actually paid in (no 
matter how much this might be).52 But this objection to the criticism seems to be 
of rather academic nature as far as involuntary creditors as opposed to 
consensual creditors are concerned. Involuntary creditors would only be 
protected by the capital maintenance rule if there was a minimum capital 
requirement.53  
Another point of criticism on the capital maintenance rule as it applied in South 
Africa was the fact that once the capital fund was diminished or lost due to 
unfortunate trading of the company it did not have to be replaced out of future 
profits. This again was unlike the situation in England where past losses had to 
be adjusted out of profits unless they could be written off in prescribed ways. The 
major weak point of the capital maintenance rule - out of the perspective of the 
creditors - was that it was not directed at the question whether the company was 
really able to pay its debt when they become due (i.e. the solvency of the 
company) but rather constituted a regulation for payment transactions from and 
to particular accounts.54 It was therefore criticized of doing virtually nothing in 
respect of the real concerns of creditors.  
                                                 
50 Cilliers et al (note 5) at para 20.03. 
51 This is in contrary to the Continental European company laws as well as English company law 
which have - as far as they are part of the European Union - to comply with the minimum capital 
requirements provided for in the Second Company Law Directive. 
52 Blackman/Jooste/Everingham (note 16) at 5_110 fn 1. 
53 Armour (note 14) at 368. 
54 Simplification Task Force Attorney-General’s Department Barton ACT 2600 ‘Corporations Law 
Simplification Program Share Capital Rules Proposal for Simplification’ available at 
http://www.takeovers.gov.au/content/743/download/share_capital_rules_november_1994.pdf 
(accessed 20 October 2005) at 2. 
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A further critical point - but in this case out of the perspective of shareholder 
value - is that the rigid capital maintenance rendered it difficult for a company to 
protect itself against manipulation of its share prices.55 Even though this 
argument had been stressed to a lesser degree in South African doctrine and 
even though it is questionable whether such a back up of share prices might 
really be desirable it was ultimately this point which was decisive for the rapid 
preparation and implementation of the amendments in 1999, i.e. the abolishment 
of the capital maintenance rule.  
1.3. Abolishment of the capital maintenance rule  
The point of origin when discussing the abolishment of the capital maintenance 
rule in general is always the development during the 1970s in the United States. 
It became generally recognized in that country that the statutory structure of ‘par 
value’ and ‘stated capital’ did not serve its original purpose in protecting creditors 
and minority shareholders. According to this doctrine, creditors as well as 
minority shareholders were able to better regulate their protection through 
negotiated agreements.56 When in 1979 all provisions regarding financial matters 
were modernized in the Model Business Corporation Act, the concept of stated 
capital and par value were deleted. This fundamental change in the United 
States was responsible for boosting the reformation process throughout the 
landscape of other common law countries.57  
The reform process in other commonwealth jurisdictions was often initiated by 
broad based law reform projects or through standing advisory committees 
established especially for this purpose. In each of the common law jurisdictions 
concerned (such as Ghana, Ontario, Federal Canada, Jersey and New 
Zealand)58 loads of materials like working papers, reports and commentaries59 
                                                 
55 Pretorius (note 16). 
56 Committee on Corporate Laws ‘Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act – 
Amendments to Financial Provisions’ (1979) 34 Bus. Law. 1867 1867-1868. 
57 Blackman/Jooste/Everingham (note 16) at 5_111; Department of Trade and Industry, South 
African Companies Registration Office Notice 724 GG 18868 of 8 May 1998.  
58 For example the Gower report for Ghana, the Kimber and Lawrence reports for Ontario, the 
Dickerson report for federal Canada, the Morgan report for Jersey and the New Zealand Law 
Commissions’s reports for Australia. 
59 Sealy (note 2) at 3-4. 
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were produced and the reform process was supported by a considerable 
discussion in the respective corporate legal community.  
The reform process in South Africa, however, differed quite considerably from 
such a proceeding. In respect of the Companies Act 197360 the issue of revising 
the capital maintenance rule was put on the table several times without actually 
setting in motion law reform measures. In 1985 the SAC first tried to launch the 
reform program by releasing a policy statement on the future development of 
Company Law including the recommendation to abolish the capital maintenance 
rule. Another press statement in this context was released in 1989 with special 
emphasis on the possibility by a company to purchase its own shares. The 
Centre for Business Law (University of Orange Free State) submitted a 
compilation with the title The Purchase by a Company of its own Shares: the 
English rule vs the American rule in 1989 which was partly utilized by the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in 1992 in order to stimulate the reform 
process.61 An active involvement of or lively discussion within the concerned 
legal community was nevertheless not achieved.62 In 1992 a sub-committee of 
the SAC was founded, the Coordinating Research Institute for Corporate Law 
(CRIC)63, with the main objective to review and modernize South African 
corporate law comprehensively as previously happened in Australia and New 
Zealand and several other Common Law jurisdictions. A broad involvement of 
academics and practitioners was thereby intended. In 1993 a three day 
international conference on the Future Development of South African Corporate 
Law, initiated by CRIC, was held in Johannesburg with the participation of some 
of the most acknowledged authorities for national and international corporate law. 
Certain conclusions were drawn from this conference, of interest for the present 
                                                 
60 As regards the Close Corporation, with the enactment of Close Corporations Act in 1984 the 
capital maintenance rule was first abandoned in favor of a solvency and liquidity test. In this new 
form of business companies with no more than ten members - which in general must be natural 
persons - can establish a cheaper and more flexible business entity. 
61 Cp. Department of Trade and Industry, Companies and Close Corporations Registration Office 
Proposals in respect of the purchase by a company of its own shares (Pretoria: 1992). 
62 Cp. press release of the Standing Advisory Committee on Company Law (SAC) of 21 August 
1992, published in Henning/Delport/Katz (note 2) at 201-202. 
63 The CRIC has its seat at the Centre for Business Law of the University of the Orange Free 
State. 
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subject is the predominant opinion that the principle of capital maintenance 
should be abolished in favor of a ‘larger fund-maintenance doctrine’, that a 
minimum required capital was not the answer to the weakness of the capital 
maintenance rule and that the necessity of the distinction between par and no 
par value shares should be questioned in favor of the no par value shares.64 In 
1994 SAC and CRIC launched another Corporate Law Reform Programme with 
different research areas whereas inter alia a thorough revision of the capital rules 
should take place with an eventual abandonment of the capital maintenance rule.  
Despite these serious initiatives no relevant break through could be achieved. No 
further discussion within the corporate community can be traced during the 
following period wherefore it is difficult to understand how all of a sudden in 1999 
the capital maintenance doctrine was nevertheless abolished to a great extent. It 
is quite surprising how these ‘start-up’ activities could have met in such a 
fundamental change brought by the Companies Amendment Act in 1999.  
However, in 1998 the DTI announced in the Government Gazette65 that there 
was urgency in introducing the necessary amendments to the companies’ 
legislation with respect to the recognition of modern concepts of capital rules. 
The DTI acknowledged that there were certain technicalities which have not yet 
been fully cleared but, that the advice of the SAC according to which a new 
dispensation concerning the ability of companies to purchase their own shares 
should not be delayed, was embraced. Even though no relevant public 
involvement in the reform activities of the SAC can be traced and even though 
the SAC itself acknowledges in its press release in 1993 that there was no such 
involvement the DTI refers to an “engaged considerable public attention over a 
protracted period” by which the SAC purportedly shall have been influenced 
when drafting its amendments of the Companies Act.66 Almost overnight the 
Companies Act 1973 was eventually amended in 1999 so as to provide for a 
company to acquire its own shares.  
                                                 
64 Reportback of issues raised in group sessions in Henning/Delport/Katz (note 2) at 182. 
65 Department of Trade and Industry (note 57). 
66 Cp. as well Fourie (note 1) at 71 where he states that up to 1996 very few articles have been 
published in South Africa which would involve a major rethinking of areas of corporate law with a 
view to their reform. 
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The motivation behind this hasty implementation of amendments takes more 
shape when reading the Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies 
Amendment Bill, 199967 (‘Memorandum to the Bill’) stated by the Minister of 
Trade and Industry: “In this regard it should be pointed out that our financial 
markets have lately entered into derivative activities on a large scale and the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) and SAFEX are rapidly becoming more 
complex and sophisticated. Markets have weakened considerably and this can 
be attributed to, inter alia, market manipulation by international banks and other 
speculators with unlimited financial resources. This factor alone poses a 
fundamental danger to our economy.  
There are inherent dangers in the impact of speculative derivative, futures and 
currency trading activities which are taking place in virtually all developed 
investment markets and now also in South Africa. These activities if taking place 
in an unscrupulous way, can easily suppress the prices of shares on the stock 
market. South Africa has now become a magnet for profitable trading by these 
speculators. This has resulted in the decline in value of most leading South 
African shares. Acquiring control of sound companies through these methods 
could lead to significant job losses and businesses closing down due to asset 
stripping and other irregular activities.  
One of the accepted and effective defences against this negative action in the 
international marketplace is the ability of strong companies to repurchase and 
cancel their own issued shares which levels the playing field in relation to those 
speculators wishing to reduce the value of a company’s shares by indiscriminate 
market activities. Legislation in most of the EEC, USA and other developed 
markets permits the repurchase of a company’s issued share capital, subject to 
solvency and liquidity criteria.” 
Even though the Minister of Trade and Industry asserts in the following that 
“allowing a company to acquire its own shares to support the market for its 
shares, thus also preserving for its shareholders the value of their shares, is but 
one advantage” and enumerates certain other benefits which such a purchase of 
                                                 
67 B17D-99. 
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its own shares might as well have68 these reasons seem to be of rather 
incidental nature. One cannot help but assume that the abolishment of the capital 
maintenance rule was to a far lesser degree motivated by academic criticism 
than by the economic pressure under which certain important shareholdings 
might have fallen after international investors have started to participate in the 
JSE Securities Exchange South Africa (JSE).  
Be that as it may, the capital maintenance rule as it applied in South Africa since 
its beginning was to a large extent abolished by the Companies Amendment Act 
of 1999. Even though the draftsmanship of the Act received serious criticism after 
its enactment and undisputedly needs further refinement, this important step of 
the Legislature in order to abolish the capital maintenance rule was broadly 
welcomed in South Africa’s corporate legal community.69  
1.4. Achievements of the Companies Amendment Act 1999 
1.4.1. In General  
With the Amendment Act 37 of 1999 a fundamental change of philosophy70 has 
taken place as far as the capital maintenance rule is concerned: the rule was to a 
large extent abolished and with it the departure from the path of English concepts 
and principles has continued. The new concepts in the Companies Amendment 
Act 37 of 1999 are heavily based on Canadian legislation, i.e. the Canada 
Business Corporations Act 1985. Before South Africa, Australia and New 
Zealand had already taken the Canadian legislation as a role model whereas 
Canada itself was influenced by precedents in the United States.71 
However, certain provisions in the Companies Act remained which are - quite 
unsystematically - still upholding the capital maintenance rule.72 Among these 
provisions is the restriction on the issue of shares at a discount, the payment of 
                                                 
68 i.e. facilitating employee share schemes, averting hostile take-overs, providing alternative 
markets. 
69 Pretorius (note 16); FHI Cassim ‘The New Statutory Provisions On Company Share 
Repurchases: A Critical Analysis’ (1999) 116 SALJ 760. 
70 Pretorius et al. (note 3) at 121. 
71 Cassim (note 69) at 760; Fourie (note 1) at 79. 
72 Cilliers et al (note 5) at para 20.04. 
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interest on share capital and the requirements in respect of redeemable 
preference shares.73
1.4.2. Acquisition of own shares 
As shown below section 1.3. the possibility for companies to acquire their own 
shares was the principal motivator for the reform process realized in 1999. 
Therefore ss 85-88 of the Companies Act have to be considered as the corner 
stone provisions within the amendments. S 85 (1) now allows a company under 
certain circumstances to acquire its own shares provided that a respective 
special resolution has been passed to this effect and that the company is 
authorized thereto by its articles. Shares so acquired by a company are to be 
cancelled and become authorized shares forthwith [s 85 (8)]. Therefore a 
reduction of the share capital takes place. The acquisition shall not have as a 
result that only redeemable preference shares remain [s 86 (9)]. The creditors 
interests are now protected by the very important requirements in s 85 (4) 
according to which a company may only acquire shares if there is a reasonable 
belief that the company is, or would after the acquisition be, able to pay its debts 
as they fall due in the ordinary course of business (the so called liquidity test) and 
that the consolidated assets of the company would after the acquisition exceed 
its consolidated liabilities (the so called solvency test). If these requirements are 
not met any creditor who was a creditor at the time of acquisition may apply to 
the court for an order to compel a shareholder to return the received 
consideration to the company and the company to reissue the shares to that 
shareholder [s 86(3)]. According to s 86 (1) directors are jointly and severally 
liable to the company for any consideration given for the acquisition of the shares 
in contravention of s 84 (4) which is not yet recovered by the company. 
According to s 89 a subsidiary company may now acquire a maximum of 10 per 
cent of the issued shares of its holding company. 
                                                 
73 Pretorius et al (note 3) at 122. 
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1.4.3. Payment of dividends 
In consequence, the dividend regulations as considered below section 1.2.4. 
above have been amended too. In terms of s 90 of the Companies Act a 
company may now make distributions to its shareholders in their capacity as 
shareholders if it is authorized hereto by its articles. S 90 (2) requires - similar to 
s 85 (4) above - that there must be reasonable grounds for believing that the 
company is, and after the payment will be, able to pay its debts as they fall due 
(liquidity test), and that the consolidated assets will, after the payment, exceed 
the consolidated liabilities (solvency test). According to s 90 (3) ‘payment’ is 
broadly defined: it includes any direct or indirect payment or transfer of money or 
other property but excludes the acquisition of shares in terms of s 85 of the 
Companies Act, the redemption of redeemable preference shares in terms of s 
98 of the Companies Act, the issue of capitalization shares as well as the 
acquisition of shares in terms of an order of the court (e.g. s 252 of the 
Companies Act). Excluded however, is a payment to a shareholder by a different 
virtue than his shareholding in the company, for example in his capacity as a 
creditor.74 The share premium account and the capital redemption reserve fund 
are as well available for payments to shareholders subject to the requirements in 
s 90 of the Companies Act.75  
1.4.4. Financial assistance for the purchase or subscription of own 
shares 
As already discussed below section 1.2.7. above, a company is according to s 38 
of the Companies Act prohibited from giving, “whether directly or indirectly, and 
whether by means of a loan, guarantee, the provision of security or otherwise, 
any financial assistance for the purpose of or in connection with a purchase or 
subscription made or to be made by any person of or for any shares of the 
company …”. Even though the Companies Act now allows under certain 
conditions the acquisition of its own shares according to ss 85-88, s 38 has not 
substantially changed. The only amendment is paragraph (d) according to which 
                                                 
74 Pretorius (note 16). 
75 Blackman/Jooste/Everingham (note 16) at 5_113. 
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financial assistance for the acquisition of shares in a company by the company or 
its subsidiary in accordance with the provisions of s 85 is exempted from the 
prohibition. But it is far from clear what this concretely means.76 However, s 38 
does still not provide for an exemption to provide financial assistance to third 
parties.77 A consequential adjustment of s 38 should have taken place in order to 
fit in with the new philosophy underlying the provisions s 85-88 and s 90 as 
discussed above. If the financial assistance is bona fide as well as in the best 
interests of the company and if it meets the solvency and liquidity tests there 
seems to be no justification why a company should be prevented from rendering 
it.78  
Additionally, s 38 renders it difficult to realize the objectives of the Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) Act, 2003. It constrains BEE consortiums who 
usually have little access to financial means or assets to provide for security 
against borrowing since a company cannot lend money to potential BEE partners 
in order to facilitate them the purchase of shares in the company. BEE 
transactions would clearly benefit from a relaxation of s 38.79
1.5. Criticism on the Companies Amendment Act 1999 
Although generally acknowledged in South African legal community that the 
Companies Amendment Act 1999 was a step in the right direction several 
features of the Act have been heavily criticized. Criticism can be divided into 
different categories: (a) the motivation of the Legislature for introducing the 
acquisition by a company of its own shares has been questioned, (b) the 
draftsmanship of the amendments has been criticized in general, (c) it has been 
challenged whether the interests of creditors and minority shareholders are 
sufficiently protected within the new provisions, (d) it has been further criticized 
that the abolishment of the capital maintenance rule has not been realized with 
                                                 
76 Blackman/Jooste/Everingham (note 16) at 5_67. 
77 Pretorius et al (note 3) at 125. 
78 A Trichardt/E Brincker ‘Future Development of South African Corporate Law - Capital in 
Company Law’ in Henning/Delport/Katz (note 2) 141 at 151. 
79 Deneys Reitz Attorneys ‘Section 38 - Let it BEE?’ Commercial Update No 12 available at 
http://www.deneysreitz.co.za/publications/pdf/Commercial%20Update%20No.12.pdf (accessed 
20 July 2005). 
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the necessary consequence throughout the Companies Act, (e) that with the 
repeal of the former ss 83-90 of the Companies Act companies have lost their 
general power to reduce share capital and finally that (f) the reform in general 
could have gone further. 
It would go beyond the scope of this assignment to restate every criticism 
brought forward in connection with the Companies Amendment Act 1999. But in 
the following, a few interesting issues shall receive more detailed consideration.  
 
(a)  As already mentioned, the corner stone of the Companies Amendment Act 
1999 are ss 85-88 allowing a company under certain conditions to purchase its 
own shares. Even though there are widely accepted reasons why a company 
should be able to acquire its own shares (buy-back) the one primarily 
accentuated in the Memorandum to the Bill is controversial in contemporary legal 
literature: to provide means for market manipulation.  
In a given case where a company tries to support the market price of its shares 
by a buy-back because it believes that its shares are undervalued, the buy-back 
has necessarily to be carried out at a premium. If the hypothesis of 
undervaluation proves to be wrong the remaining shareholders are then 
adversely affected compared with the selling shareholders. If, however, the 
assumption proves to be right then wealth is shifted from the shareholders who 
sell to those who remain in the company. Only the remaining shareholders 
participate in the anticipated glory future of the company and profit furthermore of 
a higher dividend return per share due to the diminution of the shares.80 Even if 
share buy-backs are not carried out selectively they have nevertheless a 
considerable coercive element: shareholders are forced to make a decision 
whether they sell shares or stay with an increased exposure to the company 
even though they might prefer to do neither.81 To sum up, share buy-backs in 
order to influence the market contain a serious danger that shareholders are 
treated unequal and unfairly.  
                                                 
80 RC Clark Corporate Law (Boston Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1986) 630. 
81 B McCabe ‘The Desirability of a Share Buy-Back Power’ (1991) 3 Bond LR 115 at 128. 
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It has been furthermore questioned whether there are not more appropriate 
means to convince the market that the shares are undervalued than by share 
buy-backs.82 Could not a lack of information be the reason for the 
undervaluation? Should the management of the company not look for more 
efficient ways to convey relevant facts to the market? Or could a raise of 
dividends not better express the confidence of the management in the well-being 
of the company? It has been satisfactorily shown that markets are not likely to 
“systematically and persistently” undervalue public corporations (‘efficient-
markets theory’).83 If the market does not sufficiently reward the information 
about the allegedly bright future of the company then it is far more likely that the 
inherently biased management rather than the market - which reflects an 
interaction between rational buyers and sellers84 - has wrongly assessed the 
performance of the company. If through such an ‘irrational’ repurchase of shares 
by the company the share prices are raised, this is nothing more than a distortion 
of the market without any useful economic function. Such an exertion of influence 
by a company could in fact even amount to a crime in terms of s 40(c) of the 
Stock Exchanges Control Act 1 of 1985.85  
 
(b) In one of the most fundamental critical analysis of the new provisions 
Cassim claims inter alia that the statute is defective and lacking in technical 
quality.86 Even though he welcomes the flexibility and the simplicity he considers 
some of the provisions as almost rudimentary. He objects that even though the 
Companies Amendment Act 1999 is basically built after the Canada Business 
Corporations Act 1985 its draftsmanship would be far from clear. Object of 
severe criticism is especially the lack of protection of the interests of creditors 
and minority shareholders which is considered in more detail right below (c).87  
                                                 
82 Clark (note 30) at 629. 
83 Clark (note 30) at 628-629. 
84 McCabe (note 31) at 128. 
85 Blackman/Jooste/Everingham (note 16) at 5_58. 
86 Cassim (note 69) at 780. 
87 Cassim (note 69) at 780. 
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With regards to clarity and efficiency of the provisions, several authors held that 
instead of the Canada Business Corporations Act 1975, the more recent and 
comprehensive New Zealand Companies Act of 1993 should have been taken as 
a role model. The New Zealand Companies Act is itself drawn along the lines of 
the Canada Business Corporations Act 1975 but, could already build on the 
experience of its predecessor. The New Zealand Companies Act is widely 
praised for its attractive, simple language which renders it accessible and 
functional for its users. The Act has implemented most innovative changes in 
obeying the principles of high flexibility and a maximum of freedom for business 
ventures.88
 
(c) Share repurchases by a company in general and selective (targeted) 
repurchases in special bear the danger that shareholders are not treated equally 
between them. Directors could favor certain shareholders over others or 
controlling shareholders could obtain an unfair advantage over minority 
shareholders.89 The potential dangers of share repurchases were clearly 
recognized in the document ‘Proposals in respect of the purchase by a company 
of its own shares’ released by the Department of Trade and Industry in 1992:90 
“Thus, as regards the distribution of assets, the specters of insider trading and 
price manipulation are raised and must be guarded against. As regards a 
reorganization of ownership, the unfair or discriminatory treatment of minority 
shareholders poses a potential problem area which must also be addressed. In 
respect of asset distribution, asset stripping and debt avoidance are dangers 
which must be catered for. It is submitted that it would be safe to grant a 
company the power to purchase its own shares if the power can be exercised 
only in ways which will not favour one shareholder over another and which will 
not prejudice potential investors or creditors.” 
                                                 
88 JJ Du Plessis ‘Enkele Internasionale Maatskappyregtelike Ontwikkelings’ (1992) TSAR 561 at 
576; Fourie (note 1) at 80; JPG Lessing ‘Company-law Reform in New Zealand’ (1990) 2 SA 
Merc LJ 49 at 58. 
89 Cp. Department of Trade and Industry (note 61) at 101. 
90 Cp. Department of Trade and Industry (note 61) at 101. 
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According to Cassim the provisions in ss 85-88 of the Companies Amendment 
Act 1999 do not provide sufficient protection against these clearly perceived 
dangers.91 Especially the aspect of selective share repurchase would have 
unsatisfactorily been dealt with in the Companies Amendment Act 1999.92 
According to Cassim the ‘solvency’ and ‘liquidity’ test as provided for in s 85 (4) 
of the Companies Act should be complemented through the adoption of 
additional requirements in order to obtain the degree of shareholder and creditor 
protection previously secured by the now abolished capital maintenance rule.93  
The Companies Act 1973 as it stands now foresees no limits as to how many 
shares can be acquired by a company even though of course the transaction has 
to be approved by a special resolution.94 A restriction in this regard was however 
part of the draft proposals95 as it contained a prohibition to acquire more than 1 
per cent of the shares in any month by a company.96 Australian law for example, 
prohibits the acquisition of more than 10% of the shares within a twelve-month 
period97. In addition, the draft proposal provided that a company was prohibited 
from acquiring its shares if there were reasonable grounds for believing that the 
‘realizable value of the company’s assets would after the payment be less than 
the aggregate of its liabilities and stated or declared share capital plus 
reserves’.98 S 85(4)(b) of the Companies Act as it stands now deprives the 
creditors of the protection afforded by such a stipulation that the company’s 
share capital is treated as a liability and furthermore the word ‘realizable’ value is 
substituted by the ‘consolidated’ assets/liabilities which seems not to afford any 
additional protection for creditors.99 In addition, s 85(4)(b) does not provide that 
an amount sufficient to satisfy the preferential rights of shareholders should be 
                                                 
91 Cassim (note 69) at 776. 
92 Cassim (note 69) at 776-777; cp. as well Blackman/Jooste/Everingham (note 16) at 5_90-5_91. 
93 Cassim (note 69) at 765. 
94 The JSE’s Listings Rules contain however a restriction in Rule 5.88. 
95 Department of Trade and Industry (note 57), s 7(2). 
96 Cp. as well Department of Trade and Industry (note 61) at 114. 
97 S 206C(1) and s 206D(1)of Corporations Law 1995. 
98 Department of Trade and Industry (note 57). 
99 Blackman/Jooste/Everingham (note 16) at 5_70. 
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added to the liabilities of the company. The interests of the preference 
shareholders are therefore also undermined.100  
Another further requirement proposed by Cassim could be that the necessary 
authorization in the company’s articles for share buy-backs should be renewed 
by a special resolution after a certain period in order to remain valid.101 As well a 
statutory declaration provided by the directors could be implemented, which 
confirms that the company will be able to pay its debts for a certain period after 
the date of the repurchase.102 This declaration could thereupon be supported and 
reinforced by a report of the auditors of the company that the directors have 
reasonable grounds for their belief in the solvency or liquidity of the company.103  
The potential danger of so called ‘sweet-heart’ repurchases, greenmail and 
‘going-private’ transactions could thus be encountered by such additional 
restrictions and the interests of creditors as well as minority shareholders could 
thereby adequately be safeguarded.104.  
 
(d) The major critical point below this category is the fact that the capital 
maintenance rule has not been abolished in respect of s 38 of the Companies 
Act 1973. Parts of the critics have already been mentioned below s 1.4.4. above. 
This “infamous”105 provision still prohibits a company from giving financial 
assistance for the purchase or acquisition of its own shares and therefore 
maintains the capital maintenance concept in this regard.106 The very wide ambit 
of s 38 has been criticized as likely to hit the innocent but of being futile in 
preventing the guilty.107 It would be desirable that the solvency and liquidity test 
applies also in the case of financial assistance provided however, that sufficient 
further safeguards for creditors and minority shareholders are implemented.108 
                                                 
100 Blackman/Jooste/Everingham (note 16) at 5_70. 
101 As provided for in Australian Legislation, ss 206 DA and 206 DB of the Corporations Law 
1990, cited in Cassim (note 69) at 766. 
102 Cp. s 173(3) (b) of the English Companies Act 1985, cited in Cassim (note 69) at 766. 
103 Cp. s 173(5) of the English Companies Act 1985, cited in Cassim (note 69) at 766.   
104 Cassim (note 69) at 774-76. 
105 Pretorius (note 16). 
106 Lessing (note 88) at 56. 
107 LCB Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 4ed (London: Stevens & Sons, 1979) 227. 
108 Blackman/Jooste/Everingham (note 16) at 4_58. 
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According to Cassim such further safeguards could be that the resolution to grant 
financial assistance is made subject to a special resolution by the members of 
the company as well as to a statutory declaration of the directors supported by an 
auditor’s certificate that the company remains solvent.109 The company could 
further - similarly to s 42(4) of the Business Corporations Act of Alberta 1981 - be 
required to disclose to its shareholders the identity of the person to whom 
financial assistance is to be granted as well as the nature and the amount of the 
financial assistance so given.  
 
(e) As discussed below section 1.2.3. the former ss 83-90 of the Companies 
Act conferred a general power on the company to reduce its share capital with 
the consent of its creditors and the confirmation of the court. The new s 90 in fact 
allows payments to shareholders out of capital funds without a reduction of share 
capital; it does not permit a reduction of share capital.110 For the purposes of s 90 
of the Companies Act, s 90(3) excludes an acquisition of shares in terms of s 85, 
a redemption of redeemable preference shares in terms of s 98 and any 
acquisition of shares in terms of an order of Court [s 252(3)] from the definition of 
‘payment’. These ss 85, 98 and 252(3) constitute - with one minor exception - the 
only remaining possibilities to achieve a share capital reduction.111 A general 
power to reduce share capital does not exist anymore.  
It is likely that this constraint of a company’s power is the result of an oversight of 
the legislator. One indication for this assumption is the fact that in the model set 
of Articles for a public company having a share capital (Table A) as well as in the 
model set of Articles for a private company having a share capital (Table B) the 
general possibility of a company to reduce its share capital, its stated capital, any 
capital redemption fund or any share premium account by special resolution is 
still provided for in TA 31(g) and TB 30(g). Furthermore, the reduction of share 
capital served to ‘decapitalise’ part of the capital fund - accompanied or not by 
the return of the funds to the shareholders. Since the introduction of the new s 90 
                                                 
109 Cassim (note 69) at 779. 
110 Blackman/Jooste/Everingham (note 16) at 5_112. 
111 Blackman/Jooste/Everingham (note 16) at 5_14. 
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it is indeed no longer necessary to ‘decapitalise’ first capital funds by way of a 
capital reduction before distributions can be made to shareholders112 wherefore 
the legislator has presumably considered it unnecessary to maintain a general 
possibility for companies to reduce their share capital. But a capital reduction 
entails as well an alteration or abrogation of the rights of the shareholders 
irrespective of whether or not the company actually pays out the ‘decapitalised’ 
funds. This is of course foremost the case where shares are cancelled but as 
well where the par value of shares is reduced or - in the case of no par value 
shares - where the stated capital account is reduced.113 And these options to 
influence the shareholders rights are now no longer available for a company. 
Especially a compulsory cancellation of shares in order to freeze out a 
shareholder is not possible anymore via a capital reduction114: the remaining 
ways for a company to reduce share capital (share buy-backs and the 
redemption of redeemable preference shares) require both - even though at a 
different point in time of the transaction - the consent of the concerned 
shareholders.115 There seems to be no logic explanation for such a reduction in a 
company’s power within a reform process which was generally aimed at 
rendering the share capital structure more flexible.  
 
(f) Unlike the American Revised Model Business Corporation Act and the 
New Zealand Companies Act the concept of share or stated capital and nominal 
capital has not yet been abandoned in the Companies Act 1973. Under those two 
modern Acts the concept of ‘par value’, the authorized capital and the issued 
capital have been given up and shares can be issued in any number, with any 
conditions and at any (fair) price.116 All distributions by a company are made 
subject only to liquidity and solvency tests.117 It has been questioned why capital 
                                                 
112 Blackman/Jooste/Everingham (note 16) at 5_112. 
113 Blackman/Jooste/Everingham (note 16) at 5_16. 
114 Freezeouts can however still be achieved by converting ordinary shares into redeemable 
preference shares; cp. Blackman/Jooste/Everingham (note 16) at 5_16. 
115 Blackman/Jooste/Everingham (note 16) at 5_15. 
116 PA Delport ‘Capital Rules in South African Company Law’ in JJ Henning/PA Delport/MM Katz 
(note 2) 133 at 139. 
117 Blackman/Jooste/Everingham (note 16) at 5_115. 
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accounts have been retained in South Africa. The only meaning they seem to 
have after the capital maintenance rule has principally been abolished, is 
between the shareholders themselves with regard to their claims for surplus 
assets in the case of a winding-up. In such a case a shareholder has a right to 
the sum he originally paid for the company’s shares before any further 
distribution of surplus assets is made. The capital accounts serve now simply as 
a record of the number of par value shares issued, the par value of each share, 
the total par value and the different classes of issued shares. But there seems to 
be no reason why such a record should be held in capital accounts.118
The concepts ‘nominal capital’ and ‘par value’ have been held as ‘arbitrary and 
misleading’ in modern company law systems. This view has also been adopted 
by Delport for South Africa and he recommended to abolish altogether the 
distinction between par and no par value shares in favor of no par value 
shares.119 To support this point of view it has been referred to the famous 
statement of Dickerson, Howard and Getz that “A share is simply a proportionate 
interest in the net worth of a business. Par values obscure this reality, while the 
concept of a share without par value precisely embodies it… What matters to an 
investor is the proportionate size of his investment in the corporation, not the 
arbitrary monetary denomination attributed to that investment”120.  
1.6. Reform steps to be expected 
In May 2004 the DTI released its Guidelines for a Corporate Law Reform 
(Guidelines).121 It points out repeatedly how important and overdue this reform is. 
It does not tire to emphasize that since the investigation of the Van Wyk De Vries 
Commission which resulted in the Companies Act 1973, no significant review has 
taken place but that this time reform shall be of fundamental nature.122 The 
                                                 
118 Blackman/Jooste/Everingham (note 16) at 5_16. 
119 Delport (note 116) at 139-140. 
120 RWV Dickerson/JL Howard/L Getz Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for 
Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971) 36.  
121 Department of Trade and Industry ‘South African Company Law for the 21st Century 
Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform’ (May 2004) available at 
https://www.saica.co.za/documents/Draft_policy_document_on_Corporate_Law_Reform.pdf 
(accessed 27 July 2005). 
122 Department of Trade and Industry (note 121) at 4, 8, 10, 12, 13-14, 20.  
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capital rules are thereby singled out as one of the major issues to be taken care 
of during this reform.123 Even though the Companies Act 1973 was praised for 
loosening its ties with the English law, according to the DTI it remains 
nevertheless attached to foundations laid down in Victorian England in the middle 
of the 19th century. According to these Guidelines, the most significant departure 
from English law was the adoption of the Close Corporations Act in 1984.124 
Strange enough, in the whole document the Companies Amendment Act 1999 
does not seem worthy of being mentioned even with a single word. It is true that 
this amendment was not preceded - as it was in other countries like Botswana, 
Hong Kong, Australia, Canada or New Zealand - by an extensive review of a 
reform committee or a major discussion in doctrine let alone the rest of the 
corporate legal world. But the Companies Amendment Act 1999 brought 
nevertheless significant changes especially as far as the capital rules are 
concerned. The Guidelines give the erroneous impression that the capital 
maintenance rule is in principle still upheld in the Companies Act 1973 which is 
clearly not the case. In its disregard of the changes introduced in 1999 the policy 
paper even recommends an investigation whether the US style ‘solvency-liquidity 
test’ with no initial paid up capital should apply as well for South Africa.125 Given 
the fact that an almost identical test126 already applies for share repurchases 
according to s 85 (4) of the Companies Act and distributions to shareholders 
according to s 90 (2) of the Companies Act and that furthermore South African 
Company Law never knew a minimum capital requirement these considerations 
seem somehow bizarre. The abolishment of the capital maintenance rule in 1999 
might not have been executed with every desirable consequence but it was 
unquestionably a serious step in adopting modern capital rules. It could not have 
been the intention of the Companies Amendment Act 1999 to adopt a middle 
                                                 
123 Department of Trade and Industry (note 121) at 20. 
124 Department of Trade and Industry (note 121) at 13. 
125 Department of Trade and Industry (note 121) at 34-36. 
126 Cp. as well American Bar Association Section of Business Law Committee on Corporate Laws 
‘Report on South African Companies Act No. 61 of 1973 and Related Legislation’ available at 
www.sn.apc.org/usaidsa/usaidsa/corporate.pdf (accessed 28 July 2005) 14. 
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way127 given the fact that it is obviously modeled after the Canada Business 
Corporations Act 1985 (notabene a fore rider of modern capital rules).  
To understand the development of future South African Company Law it is of 
importance to mention that a team of five American lawyers in their capacity as 
members of the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Business Law of 
the American Bar Association were invited by the South African Companies 
Registration Office (‘SACRO’) to analyze possible amendments to the 
Companies Act 1973 in connection with the review of the Companies Act. This 
fundamental survey resulted in the release of the ‘Report on South African 
Companies Act No. 61 of 1973 and Related Legislation’ (‘the Report’) in 
December 2001.128 It is noteworthy that two of the five lawyers are still closely 
involved in the current corporate law review process as part of the ‘international 
reference team’. Facing this background it is not surprising that the manner in 
which corporate finance issues are approached and the way provisions and 
principles of the Companies Act are put in question in the current reform process 
reminds one very much of the solutions found in the Revised Model Business 
Corporation Act. It can therefore be expected that the definitive version of the 
capital rules in the reformed Companies Act (currently scheduled for February 
2007) will presumably not differ much from the American predecessor.  
The major recommendation of the report in respect of the capital rules is the 
deletion of the concept of par value and the related concept of stated capital 
throughout the Companies Act. According to the Report there is no need for this 
concept anymore given the fact that the 1999 amendments to the Companies Act 
have already abandoned any reliance on par value as a standard for the 
company’s power to pay dividends or make other distributions. This 
recommendation is explained in the following terms: “Par value was originally 
developed in the early days of corporations to insure ‘equitable contribution,’ i.e., 
equal pro rata payment by stockholders for stock issued by the corporation. This 
purpose was long ago abandoned as economically unrealistic. Subsequently, par 
                                                 
127 Cp. Department of Trade and Industry (note 121) at 36. 
128 American Bar Association (note 126). 
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value and its corollary, stated capital (par value per share multiplied by the total 
number of shares outstanding), were employed as part of an equation 
determining whether the corporation could pay dividends or make other 
distributions to its stockholders. Under this equation, a corporation may not pay a 
dividend or make another distribution unless the sum of its assets at least equals 
the sum of its liabilities and its stated capital. To put it in other words, a 
corporation could make distributions only out of “surplus.” With the development 
of low-par and no-par stock, this reason for par value has also evaporated. 
Today, it is widely recognized that par value, especially a low par value, is 
economically insignificant and artificial. Accordingly, in the mid-1980s, the Model 
Act abolished par value altogether. In its place, Section 6.40 of our Model Act 
substituted the equity and balance-sheet solvency tests, which we note that 
South Africa has also adopted as the standard for acquisition of its shares by a 
company (Section 85(4)) and for payments to shareholders (Section 90(2)).”129
In a consequent abandonment of the par value concept s 81 of the Companies 
Act (issue of shares of par value at a discount) should as well be deleted as there 
is no economic connection between par value and the price at which shares are 
issued by the company.130 The representatives of the American Bar Association 
see no reason why the company should not be able to issue shares at whatever 
price it can get, even though such a price might be lower than par value - a 
concept anyway to be abandoned.131 As regards s 85 of the Companies Act 
(Company may under certain circumstances acquire shares issued by it) the 
report recommends giving up the requirement of a special resolution as a pre-
condition for share repurchases. This requirement would in any case be satisfied 
by a boilerplate resolution presented to the shareholders every year which would 
not provide any significant protection to them.132 Furthermore a special resolution 
                                                 
129 American Bar Association (note 126) at 14-15; cp. as well Department of Trade and Industry 
(note 121) at 17, where an almost identical wording is used in order to recommend the review of 
capital rules. But again, the part that South Africa has already adopted in 1999 an equity and 
balance-sheet solvency test similar to the Revised Model Business Corporation Act is suppressed 
in the Guidelines. 
130 American Bar Association (note 126) at 15. 
131 Consequently, s 82 regarding no par value shares should as well be deleted. 
132 American Bar Association (note 126) at 15. 
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should not be required for distributions to shareholders according s 90 of the 
Companies Act as it has the same economic effect on the company as share 
repurchases (where such a resolution is as well not required). Therefore the 
Report suggests to delete s 85 (1) - (3) of the Companies Act.133 As regards 
preference shareholders the Report would welcome a clarification whether their 
preference rights should be treated as liabilities when determining the power of 
the company to acquire its shares.134 Additionally, the Report recommends a 
more explicit statement in ss 85-87 according to which the acquisition of shares 
on a non-pro rata basis is generally permitted.135 As regards s 90 (1) of the 
Companies Act, the Report recommends the deletion of the requirement that 
distributions to shareholders must be authorized by the articles of the company 
since this would again simply lead to a respective boilerplate provision in the 
articles.136 Since after the Companies Amendment Act 1999 there is no need to 
rely on profits of the company in order to acquire its own shares or to make 
distributions to its shareholders it seems inconsequent that s 98 of the 
Companies Act (Redeemable preference shares) still resorts to the concept of 
‘redemption of redeemable preference shares out of profits’. The Report 
therefore recommends amending s 98 so as to bring it in conformity with s 74 
and 90.137 And last but not least the Report regards s 38 of the Companies Act 
(No financial assistance to purchase shares of company or holding company) as 
outdated. Modern corporate practice would require that no limit with regard to the 
provision of financial assistance for the purchase of the company’s shares should 
be set anymore.138
The Guidelines have almost verbatim taken up the recommendations of the 
Report with regards to the presently interesting capital rules which represent 
certainly one of the most forward-looking parts of the extensive Company law 
                                                 
133 American Bar Association (note 126) at 15-16. 
134 American Bar Association (note 126) at 16. 
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137 American Bar Association (note 126) at 17. 
138 American Bar Association (note 126) at 11. 
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review currently underway in South Africa.139 The DTI has planned to consult a 
whole range of stakeholders as well as further local and international experts.140 
With regard to capital rules the debate will deal with the following questions: 
- Should the par value and stated capital concept be abolished in the South 
African Companies Act? What may be the resulting complications of the 
abolition and how can such complications be dealt with? 
- Should the board of directors be given an open power to endorse equity 
financing for the company without previous shareholder consent? 
- Is there still any need to prohibit or restrict the issuance of shares at a 
discount or should s 81 and s 82 be abolished? Should the company be 
therefore allowed to issue its shares at whatever price it can get? 
- Should s 85 be brought in congruence with s 90 in respect of the 
requirements and the additional constraint of a special resolution be 
abolished? Any share repurchase and distribution to shareholders would 
then be only subject to a solvency and liquidity test. 
- Should preference shareholders receive explicit protection within the 
solvency test of s 85 and s 90 by treating their preference rights as 
liabilities of the company? 
- S 98 (redemption of redeemable preference shares) should be brought in 
line with the share buy-back (ss 85-88) and dividend provisions (s 90). 
- Should a company not be prohibited or limited anymore in giving financial 
assistance to purchasers of its shares? Should the prohibition in s 38 be 
deleted or rather added with more exceptions? If it is deleted, what kind of 
safeguards would protect against misuse by directors or majority 
shareholders? 
                                                 
139 Department of Trade and Industry (note 121) at 17, 34-35. 
140 Department of Trade and Industry (note 121) at 52-53. 
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2. Legal situation in Switzerland 
2.1.  Capital maintenance rule 
2.1.1. Introduction 
As opposed to South African Company Law and in congruence with European 
Company Law share capital protection is still a fundamental part of Swiss 
Company Law141. The respective rules can broadly be divided into such 
concerning the provision of share capital, such concerning the maintenance of 
share capital and such giving a coercive signal to embark on emergency 
measures in case of substantial capital loss.142 The reason why share capital 
deserves special protection has been explained with the limited liability of the 
company.143
When considering the capital protection rules in Switzerland it is certainly 
necessary to start with the notional size ‘par value share capital’. The principle is 
stated in Article 620 s 1 of the Swiss Code of Obligations (OR): “A corporation is 
a company with its own company name whose predetermined capital (share 
capital) is divided into parts (shares) and whose liability is limited to the 
Company’s assets.” The minimum share capital according to Article 621 OR is 
one hundred thousand Swiss Francs whereby upon incorporation of the 
company, a contribution of at least twenty percent of the par value of each share 
must be made. The contribution must however in all cases total at least fifty 
thousand Francs (Article 632 OR). The par value share capital is a fixed amount 
expressed in the currency of Switzerland (CHF) which is stated in the articles of 
incorporation of the Company as well as in the Commercial Register at the place 
of the domicile of the Company. It is divided into a certain amount of shares each 
having a par value expressed in the local currency which shall not be less than 1 
                                                 
141 The notion ‘Swiss Company Law’ not only refers to the law of share holding companies 
(corporations) but as well to some other company forms. However, for the purpose of this 
assignment ‘Swiss Company Law’ shall be understood in the restricted sense of ‘Swiss 
Corporation Law’ in order to use a consistent terminology.  
142 P Böckli Schweizer Aktienrecht 3ed (Zürich Basel Genf: Schulthess Juristische Medien AG 
2004) s 97. 
143 R von Büren/WA Stoffel/K Schnyder/C Christen-Westenberg Aktienrecht (Zürich: Schulthess, 
2000) s 197. 
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cent (Article 622 s 4 OR). Shares can only be issued at or above par value 
(Article 624 OR). The multiplication of the share par value with the amount of 
shares is equivalent with the par value share capital.  
The function which has been attributed to the concept of par value capital is 
fourfold: first it represents a minimum capital which has to be paid in by the 
shareholder (capital provision), secondly, as a principle of transparency, the 
founding members of the company are obligated to publicize the minimum 
capital, thirdly it represents a limitation for distributions to shareholders as the 
minimum capital cannot be paid back to them (capital maintenance) and fourthly 
it is a bar for distributions if - after deduction of all liabilities - the minimum capital 
is not covered anymore by genuinely valued assets. After such a capital loss has 
occurred this prohibition lasts as long as the minimum capital has not been 
recovered out of future profits (capital maintenance).144 The par value share 
capital system is usually justified with providing creditor protection. But especially 
this alleged function has been put in question in doctrine and the par value share 
system has been subject of criticism which will be looked at closer below section 
2.2.  
The systematic how the capital maintenance rule in Switzerland will be discussed 
in the following will slightly deviate from the one used in the South African part. 
The reason for this is that the capital maintenance doctrine in Switzerland is not 
afforded the same independent and outstanding significance as it has or at least 
had in common law countries. The capital maintenance rule is rather part of a 
holistic concept of share capital protection as described above and is hardly 
independently put in question in doctrine. The critical analysis starts at a logical 
step right ahead that is with the notional size of share capital as stated in the 
capital account.145 The legal size ‘share capital’ is a bar figure (‘Sperrziffer’) in 
the balance sheet. The completion of different functions is related to this figure, 
only one of them is the maintenance of capital. In order to understand the legal 
situation in Switzerland with respect to the capital maintenance rule it is therefore 
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the share capital ‘as stated in the share capital account’. 
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necessary to summarize in the following all of the three functions allegedly 
justifying the continual application of the share capital concept.  
2.1.2. The Raise of Share Capital (Principle of Coverage) 
The principle of coverage (‘Deckungsprinzip’) guarantees that the share capital 
as stated in the Articles of the company as well as in the Commercial Register is 
actually raised and can be freely (without conditions and in respect of the whole 
amount) used by the company. The subscription of the share capital - whether 
during the founding process or during the increase of the share capital - requires 
the unconditional commitment of the present or prospective shareholder to make 
a contribution equal to the issue price (Article 630 cypher 2 OR). The founders 
must establish in the deed of incorporation that the promised contributions 
correspond to the total amount of the issue (Article 629 s 2 cypher 2 OR). As 
seen above shares may only be issued at or above par value (Article 624 s 1 
OR) and the share capital must be paid up to a minimal amount (20% of the par 
value of each share, but in all cases at least CHF 50’000; Article 632 OR). Until 
the legally required minimal amount is not paid in, the company cannot come into 
legal existence since it cannot obtain the necessary entry into the Commercial 
Register or, as far as an increase of share capital is concerned, the increase will 
not become valid until the entry into the Commercial Register is conferred upon 
the company.146 There are many more provisions which are directed at the 
realization of the principle of coverage for example, Article 632 OR where money 
contributions must be deposited at the exclusive disposal of the Company at an 
institution subject to the Federal Law of November 8, 1934, Relating to Banks 
and Saving Banks. The institution can only release the amount upon the 
Company’s entry in the Commercial Register. Of foremost importance in 
realization of this principle is Article 634 OR concerning contributions in kind 
where protection against fraud is foremost required: “Contributions in kind are 
deemed to cover only if they are made based upon a written or publicly notarized 
contract of contributions in kind, if the Company, upon its entry in the Commercial 
                                                 
146 von Büren/Stoffel/Schnyder/Christen-Westenberg (note 143) at s 210. 
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Register, may, in its capacity as owner, immediately dispose thereof, or receive 
an unconditional claim for entry in the Real Estate Register and if a founders’ 
report together with the confirmation of examination is presented.” All these 
requirements make sure that at least in the moment when the company comes 
into existence or when the increase of capital has taken place the commercially 
active public may trust in the existence of the capital as publicized in the Articles 
of the Company and in the Commercial Register.  
2.1.3. Maintenance of Capital 
(a) Distributions to shareholders 
As explained above, the share capital is a rigid, notional figure which does not 
depend on the development of the business of a company. It is reflected on the 
right hand side of the balance sheet and indicates the amount which should at 
least be covered by the assets of the company at every point in time. Up to the 
amount of the share capital a company may use its assets only for paying its 
debts. Shareholders have no right to claim return on their contribution (Article 
680 s 2 OR). A repayment of the share capital to the share holders is possible 
only upon liquidation of the company or partial liquidation, i.e. capital 
reduction.147 In Switzerland share capital is not considered as a debt of the 
company towards its shareholders.148  
Not only is a direct repayment of the share capital prohibited - distributions out of 
profits are only allowed if the balance sheet of the company actually attests that a 
profit has been generated.149 In order to make sure that profits are properly 
established Swiss Law Accounting Rules apply for the rendering of accounts.150 
It follows the principles of completeness of annual financial statement, of clarity 
and essentiality of statements, of prudence and of consistency in presentation 
                                                 
147 T Guhl/A Kummer/JN Druey Das Schweizerische Obligationenrecht 8ed (Zürich: Schulthess 
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150 C Baudenbacher in H Honsell/P Vogt Nedim/R Watter (eds) Basler Kommentar zum 
Schweizerischen Privatrecht, Obligationenrecht II, Art. 530–1186 OR 2ed (Basel Genf München: 
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and valuation. The setting off of assets and liabilities, as well as of expenses and 
income is prohibited (cp. Articles 662 ff. OR).  
In order to prevent the distribution of an increase in value not actually realized 
and therefore to prevent the drain of liquidity the Swiss Law Accounting Rules 
allow with few exceptions only the realized profit to be assigned to the balance 
sheet profit (as the decisive size for the declaration of dividends according to 
Article 675 s 2 OR).151 Capital assets are for example to be valued at a maximum 
of the acquisition or manufacturing costs less the necessary depreciation (Article 
665 OR). The same applies for raw materials, semi-finished, finished products 
and merchandise (Article 666 s 1 OR). If the acquisition or manufacturing cost 
are higher than the market value generally applicable on the date of the balance 
sheet, then such market value is determinative (Article 666 s 2 OR). In every 
case, assets can never be valued higher than their value to the business on the 
date of the balance sheet (Article 960 s 2 OR).152  
Distributions to shareholders without a corresponding profit determined according 
to Swiss Law Accounting Rules would amount to a repayment of share capital. 
Dividends can only be paid out of a duly established balance sheet profit or out of 
reserves created for this purpose (Article 675 s 2 OR). Similarly, share 
repurchases are prohibited as long as there is no freely disposable equity 
available (Art. 659 s 1 OR). As long as the assets as well as the liabilities are not 
covered by fairly valued assets all profits generated by the company must first 
and exclusively be used to recover the capital deficiency. Until full coverage is 
achieved the prohibition of distribution persists.153  
(b) Legal reserves and reserves according to the articles of 
incorporation 
The ‘Sperrziffer’ share capital may be increased by legal reserves (cp. Articles 
671 OR ff.). 5% of the annual profit must be allocated to the general reserve until 
it has reached 20% of the share capital (Article 671 s 1 OR). Even after having 
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reached the statutory amount allocations must continue in certain instances: for 
example 10% of the amounts which are distributed as a share of profits after 
payment of a dividend of 5% or any surplus over par value upon the issue of new 
shares after deduction of the issue cost must be credited to the general reserves 
(Article 671 s 2 cypher 1 and 3 OR). And in case of a share repurchase an 
amount corresponding to the acquisition value must be allocated to legal 
reserves designated as reserves for own shares (Article 659a s 2 OR). Reserves 
for own shares may in case of alienation or cancellation of shares be dissolved to 
a maximum of their acquisition value (Article 671a OR). General legal reserves 
which are not exceeding half of the share capital may however only be applied to 
cover losses or for measures bound to maintain the company in bad business 
times, to counteract unemployment, or to soften its consequences (Article 671 s 
3 OR).  
The articles of incorporation may according to Article 672 s 1 OR provide even 
for higher amounts than 5% of the annual profit to be allocated to the reserve 
or/and that the reserve must amount to more than 20% of the share capital 
prescribed in Article 671 s 1 OR. Only after the allocations to the legal reserve 
and to the reserves provided for by the articles of incorporation have been made, 
dividends may be declared. The bar figure is therefore strictly speaking not 
limited to the share capital. It can be increased by legal and statutory reserves 
(not destined for the purpose of profit distribution).  
(c) Acquisition of own shares 
As already mentioned above the acquisition of a company of its own shares can 
as well constitute a form of redistribution of share capital. Liquidity is taken away 
from the company which could have otherwise been invested according to the 
purpose of the company. Real assets are replaced through participation on 
preexisting net assets and become thereby a non value asset.154 This 
participation of the company in its own assets appears henceforth in the form of 
treasury shares on the left hand side of the balance sheet whereas the share 
capital on the right hand side remains intact. Unlike the precaution measures 
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provided in the liquidation or capital reduction procedure distributions of the 
company’s liquidity through a share repurchase would take place without 
safeguards for creditors or minority shareholders.155 Share capital protection 
would be rendered illusionary. In consideration of these potential risks, share 
repurchases were first forbidden in Swiss Company Law, then between 1936 and 
1992 prohibited with few exceptions and since 1992 allowed within strict limits: 
the total par value of treasury shares may not exceed 10% of the share capital 
(Article 659 s 1 OR) and as already mentioned above the acquisition must be 
effected through freely disposable equity over the necessary amount. The same 
limitations apply for share repurchases executed by a subsidiary of the company 
in which the company holds majority participation (Article 659b s 1 OR). The 
voting right connected with treasury shares cannot be executed, i.e. remains 
inactive (Article 659a s 1 OR).  
(d) Financial assistance to purchase shares  
A provision similar to s 38 (No financial assistance to purchase shares of 
company or holding company) of the Companies Act does not exist in Swiss 
Company Law. Different provisions make it however clear that at least the issue 
of shares might not be validly taken place if the company itself provides the 
financial means necessary for the acquisition. The subscription on incorporation 
requires according to Article 630 s 2 OR an unconditional commitment to make a 
contribution equal to the issue price. Before the necessary contribution is not fully 
paid in on a special account the company will not be registered in the 
Commercial Register and therefore not come into legal existence. On 
incorporation the contribution may only be made in money or in kind (Articles 633 
ff. OR). Subsequent performance of (initial) contributions can as well be made by 
set-off (Article 634a s 2 OR). As far as an increase of share capital is concerned 
Article 652c OR provides that contributions must be performed in accordance 
with the provisions on incorporation if the law does not provide otherwise. 
Contributions may therefore only be made in money, in kind or by set-off. 
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Consequently an issue of shares cannot be financed by the company itself, the 
necessary contribution must come from the acquirer.  
However, there is no provision which would allow such a conclusion in relation to 
a share purchase. It is on the contrary acknowledged that a company may for 
example confer loans to its (actual or future) shareholders even though such a 
transaction might be critical.156 The loan is in this case normally not invested 
according to the purpose of the company. Such an operation can render the 
members of the board of directors liable according to Article 754 s 1 OR if it is 
connected with a violation of the duty of care. This would be the case for 
example if the board of directors does not - when conceding the loan - allocate 
the risk rationally or does not apply at arms length conditions or if the rules of 
share capital protection are thereby violated, in the extreme case if the granting 
of a loan would amount to a reimbursement of the shareholders contribution.157 
As a result it must be concluded that even though a company (or its subsidiary) is 
in principle not prohibited from granting financial assistance to third persons for 
the purchase of its shares (or for the purchase of the shares of the holding 
company) the board of directors is running thereby a considerable risk in 
becoming liable for damage suffered by the company, shareholders and 
creditors.  
(e) Share capital reduction 
The only way in which the share capital of a company going concern can legally 
be diminished is through a formal reduction procedure according to Articles 732 
ff. OR. A reduction below the required minimum capital of CHF 100’000 is 
however prohibited (Article 732 s 5 OR). There are three different kinds a capital 
reduction may take place: first, a simplified procedure in the event of a capital 
deficiency in order to readjust the balance sheet, secondly, a simplified 
procedure in case the reduced share capital is simultaneously replaced by new 
fully paid in capital to the preexisting level and thirdly the presently interesting 
case where the reduction takes place in order to return the respective amount to 
                                                 
156 Böckli (note 142) at s 544. 
157 Böckli (note 142) at s 545. 
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the shareholders. In this last case the share capital reduction is material, i.e. it 
equals a partial liquidation of the company, wherefore the need for safeguard 
measures is perceived as evident. It entails changes on both side of the balance 
sheet: on the right hand side the bar figure share capital is reduced whereby the 
left hand side is diminished due to the disposition over the newly available 
assets.158  
The legal procedure applying to a material capital reduction can be summarized 
as follows: First, it must be established by a special auditors’ report that claims of 
the creditors are fully covered in spite of the intended share capital reduction. 
This is a precondition that a general meeting of shareholders can be held and a 
resolution over the capital reduction can be passed with the necessary 
amendment of the respective article of incorporation (Article 732 s 1 OR). The 
author of the auditors’ report must be present at the general meeting of 
shareholders (Article 732 s 2 OR). The resolution must state the findings of the 
auditors’ report and indicate the ways and means by which the reduction of the 
share capital shall be implemented (Article 732 s 3 OR). After a positive 
resolution within the shareholder meeting the board of directors must publish the 
decision three times in the Swiss Official Gazette of Commerce. Furthermore, it 
must notify the creditors that they may request satisfaction or security within two 
months calculated from the third publication in the Swiss Official Gazette of 
Commerce (Article 733 OR). After the expiration of the time period set for the 
creditors and after all creditors who have filed claims have been satisfied or 
secured the reduction of share capital may be implemented. The necessary entry 
into the Commercial Register however is only conceded if it is established by a 
notarized deed that the provisions in Articles 732 ff. OR have been complied with 
(Article 734 OR).  
2.1.4. Signal for emergency measures 
The third part of capital protection rules is concerned with the situation when a 
company suffers a substantial capital loss. In broad terms, the rules tell the board 
                                                 
158 Böckli (note 142) at s 336; Forstmoser/Meier-Hayoz/Nobel (note 152) at § 53 s 14-17. 
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of directors in case of continually decreasing equity when and how to embark on 
emergency measures. Depending on the degree share capital and legal reserves 
are not covered any more by duly valued assets, Swiss Company Law institutes 
a so called ‘warning bell’159. A continued trading without equity base shall be 
prevented in the interest of shareholders, creditors (especially potential new 
ones) and employees.160 The ‘warning bell’ rings if the last annual balance sheet 
shows that half of the share capital and the legal reserves are no longer covered. 
In this case the board of directors must without delay call a general meeting of 
shareholders and propose a financial reorganization (Article 725 s 1 OR). In case 
of a substantiated concern of over-indebtedness, an interim balance sheet must 
be prepared and submitted to the auditors for examination. If the interim balance 
sheet shows that the claims of the Company’s creditors are not covered 
anymore161 then the board of directors must notify the judge unless creditors can 
be found who subordinate their claims to the extent of insufficient coverage 
(Article 725 s 2 OR). Upon being notified, the judge either adjudicates the 
bankruptcy or postpones it if so requested by the board of directors or a creditor 
provided that there is a prospect of a financial reorganization (Art. 725a s 1 OR).  
2.2. Criticism on the share capital concept  
As discussed in the introduction, Swiss Company Law is still based on the par 
value share capital system. Continental European Company Law in general 
differentiates between ‘notional no par value shares’ (foremost ‘Stückaktien’) and 
‘real no par value shares’ (so called ‘echte nennwertlose Aktien’). According to 
this differentiation South African Company Law currently knows only the ‘notional 
no par value shares’ but is otherwise - as shown above - still based on the par 
value or stated capital concept. The introduction of ‘real’ as opposed to ‘notional 
no par value share’ would imply the complete abolishment of the no par value 
share capital concept. Both of these share categories are still unknown in Swiss 
Company Law whereas European Company law allows at least the ‘notional no 
                                                 
159 Böckli (note 142) at s 101b, 106; Guhl/Kummer/Druey (note 147) at 634-635; 
Forstmoser/Meier-Hayoz/Nobel (note 152) at § 50 s 193 ff.. 
160 Böckli (note 142) at s 713. 
161 Neither to ongoing business values or liquidation values. 
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par value share’. Both, German and French Company Law have introduced this 
share category in 1998 in order to facilitate the introduction of the EURO.162  
As far as ‘notional no par value shares’ (in the form of ‘Stückaktien’) are 
concerned it is quite undisputed in doctrine that they should be introduced in 
Swiss Company Law as well. The reason being is that the ‘par value’ concept is 
misleading in the sense that it led to the wrong assumption that this figure 
attributed to each share, would have something to do with its real value which is 
clearly not the case. The par value of each share is nothing more than a 
mathematical operation, i.e. the division of the share capital through the number 
of issued shares. The share capital again is independent of the value of the 
assets within the company or the economic development of a company; it is only 
a legal size without economic significance.163 With the proceeding business 
activities of a company share capital looses every relation to the effective value 
of the company.164 The economic value of each share can therefore not be 
deduced from the share capital (or at least not longer than during a few logical 
seconds on incorporation of the company) but must be understood as a fractional 
participation on the assets of a company. With the introduction of the ‘notional no 
par value shares’ there would be henceforth no indication of the par value on the 
share certificate, in the Articles of Incorporation or in the Commercial Register 
anymore. However, every share would still have a notional or arithmetic par 
value - even though invisible - which is arrived at by dividing the share capital by 
the number of issued shares.165 The reform would be of a rather formal nature 
with the one didactical advantage that the wrong assumption a share’s value 
would depend on the share capital would become less likely. The number of 
shares having no par value could be increased or diminished without necessarily 
at the same time increasing or decreasing the share capital. The par value would 
                                                 
162 cp. Stückaktiengesetz of 25 March 1998 and revision of Article 268 LSC of 2 July 1998; HC 
von der Crone ’Bericht zu einer Teilrevision des Aktienrechts: nennwertlose Aktien’ (2002) 1 
Reprax 1 at 7. 
163 WA Stoffel ’Abschaffung des Nennkapitalsystems im schweizerischen Aktienrecht?’ (2001) 23 
SJZ 533 at 536. 
164 von der Crone (note 162) at 5. 
165 P Böckli ‚Nennwertlose Aktien und Kapitalschutz’ in RJ Schweizer/H Burkert /U Gasser (eds) 
Festschrift für Jean Nicolas Druey (Zürich/Basel/Genf: Schulthess, 2002) 331 at 337. 
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in this case be changed implicitly without an adjustment on every share 
certificate. Any change of par value would therefore remain without 
consequence, formally as well as materially.166  
As already discussed, the par value of a share says nothing about the economic 
value of a share. It can therefore be questioned whether the par value should still 
be retained even though only in the form of ‘notional no par value shares’. Why 
not entirely abandon the par value or share capital concept and introduce the 
‘real par value share’? Without a share capital the present underpinning of the 
threefold capital protection function would disappear.167 The question is therefore 
whether this function still justifies the preservation of the share capital. Does 
share capital protection, particularly the capital maintenance rule, work 
satisfactorily in praxis and deliver on what it was introduced for?  
The capital maintenance rule is usually justified with the fact that a fundamental 
conflict of interests is part of every corporation with limited liability.168 The conflict 
of interests exists between shareholders, foremost majority shareholders, which - 
driven by short term gain maximizing objectives - are disposed to draw as much 
equity from the company to their own funds as possible and other stakeholders, 
especially creditors who have trusted in the existence of the publicized share 
capital before agreeing to trade with the company.169 Such equity drain may be 
realized for example in the form of dividends, hidden profit distribution or loans to 
shareholders. The principle aim of share capital protection is therefore to prevent 
especially majority shareholders and members of the management from an 
unlimited and uncontrolled withdrawal of company’s funds.  
However, it has been held that the relation between share capital and equity has 
changed over the last century in a way rendering the usefulness of share capital 
protection questionable. During the last century it was common that a generated 
profit would normally almost entirely be redistributed to the shareholders in the 
form of dividends. After the distribution of the dividends the equity was typically 
                                                 
166 Böckli (note 165) at 340. 
167 Böckli (note 165) at 343. 
168 A company as understood in this assignment is always a corporation with limited liability.  
169 Böckli (note 142) at s 109, 111. 
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again identical with the share capital. In consequence the law protected 
automatically almost the whole equity as presented on the balance sheet of a 
given company from being redistributed to the shareholders. For the last 
approximate 100 years the dividend policy however has changed, both in listed 
and unlisted companies, whereas the respective law remained almost 
untouched. Dividend policy is today rather aimed at a sustainable retention of 
profits than at its distribution. Reserves (besides the legally prescribed one) have 
deliberately been built up within the companies and the normal pay-out ratio has 
dropped to between 25% and 40%. Only in very few sectors for example, with 
banks, 50% of the profits are still distributed. As a result the reserves in an 
average successful, 20 year old company (and most of the small and medium-
sized companies in Switzerland have around this age) have grown exponentially 
and the share capital has typically shrunk to a small, insignificant portion of the 
equity. The consequences are evident: the bar function of the share capital 
protects only a small, insignificant portion of the entire equity and becomes 
thereby significantly less important. The bigger part of the equity is excluded from 
the capital protection rules and is available for dividends to shareholders.170 The 
debts of such companies are normally far higher than their share capital and a 
rational potential creditor would never deduce from the company’s share capital 
to its creditworthiness.171 A contractual creditor can ask for additional, sufficient 
safeguards but the protection of non-contractual creditors through the share 
capital system has become largely illusionary. The introduction of a personal 
liability of the founders and shareholders in case of an obvious 
undercapitalization would be of far more value to non-contractual creditors.172  
But even as far as this remaining portion of the equity, the share capital, is 
concerned the capital maintenance rule can be evaded and the whole protection 
function of the share capital be annulled through returning funds by way of loans 
granted by the company to its shareholders.173  
                                                 
170 Böckli (note 142) at s 112 ff. 
171 Stoffel (note 163) at 536. 
172 Stoffel (note 163) at 536. 
173 Böckli (note 165) at 344. 
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Finally, as far as the ‘warning bell’ function of the share capital is concerned it 
often ‘rings’ too late since it refers to a historic size, i.e. the share capital. The 
board of directors is therefore often obliged to embark on emergency measures 
not until most of the equity is already lost. In such a situation it is usually too late 
to realize a turn around of the negative business development.174 Economically 
really important alarm signs can therefore not be derived from the share 
capital.175  
Besides these specific points of criticism there are also voices in Swiss legal 
doctrine which criticizes the share capital system as a whole and would like to 
see it either abandoned in favor of a system modeled along the lines of the 
American Revised Model Business Corporation Act (American Model) or at least 
substantially modified in order to achieve a more flexible structure of the share 
capital. The advantages of the American Model are perceived in its pragmatism 
and result orientation. The continental European share capital system - despite 
its stringency and comprehensiveness it might have developed over the last 
century - is in contrast characterized as formal and rigid with a tendency to 
bypass the real problems.176 The argument is not that the non share capital 
system would provide better but equivalent creditor protection wherefore the 
justification for the share capital concept becomes questionable. Even though the 
important law authorities on this field agree that the share capital system as 
actually provided for in the Swiss Code of Obligations is inexpedient and too rigid 
to meet the actual economic and social challenges of Company Law and would 
welcome a more flexible share capital structure the recommended alternative 
models differ quite considerably. In the following chapter, three schemes for a 
more flexible share capital structure will be discussed in more detail. 
                                                 
174 Böckli (note 165) at 345. 
175 Stoffel (note 163) at 536. 
176 Stoffel (note 163) at 539, 542; von der Crone (note 162) at 4. 
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2.3. Schemes for a more flexible share capital structure  
(a) The most advanced proposal demands a complete abolishment of the share 
capital system following the American Model.177 Creditors are thereby not 
protected by share capital protection rules but through private instruments like 
ratings and contractually agreed ratios to be observed by the company or - 
especially as far as non-contractual creditors are concerned - by the personal 
liability of founders and shareholders in case of significant undercapitalization. 
According to this scheme creditors are not per se better off when the share 
capital system is abolished but, not worse either since share capital protection 
would provide only an illusionary security. According to the share capital 
protection rules the board of director is indeed not allowed to return assets up to 
the amount of the share capital to its shareholders. But within the limits given by 
its duty of care it is not prevented from embarking on very risky undertakings 
whereby the whole equity can be ventured to the disadvantage of creditors and 
minority shareholders.178
Share capital is fixed on incorporation. It can later be changed (increased or 
reduced) in principle only by a resolution of the shareholder meeting and under 
the observance of several safeguards especially as far as share capital 
reductions are concerned. The supremacy to decide over the share capital of a 
company is therefore on incorporation as well as during its existence with the 
general meeting of shareholders.  
In the non share capital system according to the American Model the board of 
directors is in contrast vested with large authority. Representative for this fact is 
already the issue of shares: Shares are issued in the amount and in the form 
considered necessary for the intended business activity by the board of 
directors.179 The eligible consideration is very broad and ranges from 
contributions in money, kind or (rendered and future) services. Opposed to this 
broad discretion stands the general liability of founders and shareholders vis-à-
                                                 
177 Stoffel (note 163) at 539, 542; WA Stoffel ’Nennwertlose Aktien für die Schweiz? Plädoyer für 
eine Reform des Aktienrechts’ NZZ 19/20 May 2001 at 29. 
178 Stoffel (note 163) at 538. 
179 Stoffel (note 163) at 539. 
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vis creditors in case of undercapitalization and the liability of the board of 
directors in case it treats shareholders non-equal.  
In Swiss Company law the issue of shares (cp. Articles 632 ff. OR) is a very 
formalistic and highly sensitive process as seen below 2.1.2. whereas on the 
other hand a general liability for undercapitalization does not exist. As far as 
share capital increases are concerned the system in Switzerland has already 
become more flexible since the last revision in 1991 with the introduction of the 
authorized increase of capital (cp. Article 651 OR)180 but is still lacking behind the 
American Model. The power for share capital increases ultimately remains with 
the shareholder meeting whereas in the American Model the issue of shares is in 
the power of the board of directors and is only limited by its fiduciary duties, 
especially the duty of care vis-à-vis the existing shareholders, in order to prevent 
so called oppressive issuances.181  
Liability of corporate bodies in the non capital system never depends on a 
technical notion like share capital. It is rather based on general principles like the 
before mentioned fiduciary duties, the duty to safeguard the interests of the 
company as well as the duty to inform shareholders accurately. The broad 
formulation of these duties serves creditor as well as shareholder interests and 
has a wide potential for further law development in this area. In Switzerland the 
liability of corporate bodies in contrast is most often deduced from the notion 
share capital and its coverage on a specific point in time (Article 725 OR). This 
formalistic approach hardly possesses potential for a result orientated further 
development.182  
According to the proponents of this approach the non share capital system has 
the advantage to address the real problems. The general liability principles allow 
the finding of appropriate results since they are open for interpretation and 
                                                 
180 According to Article 651 s 1 OR the general meeting of shareholders can now, by amendment 
to the articles of incorporation, authorize the board of directors to increase the share capital within 
a period of no longer than two years. According to s 2 the par value by which the board of 
directors may increase the share capital must be indicated in the articles of incorporation and 
cannot exceed half of the current share capital. Within the scope of authorization the board of 
directors can implement the increases of the share capital (s 3).  
181 Stoffel (note 163) at 539. 
182 Stoffel (note 163) at 541. 
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development. The non share capital system is rather directed at the material 
result than at the protection of formalistic procedures. Further law developments 
in response of changing requirements do not necessarily demand a law reform. 
The rigid share capital system on the other hand might be simpler in application 
but is often bypassing the real problems whereas relatively unproblematic 
procedures are rendered unnecessarily complicated. It clings to formalistic and 
systematic structures which afford a rather deceiving security. A non share 
capital system would allow a commitment to material and economic principles, 
e.g. the introduction of general liability rules for the board of directors, thereby 
replacing the formalistic control derived from the share capital.183  
 
(b) A less resolute proposal welcomes in fact the introduction of ‘real par value 
shares’ but without giving up capital protection rules.184 It acknowledges the 
advantages of giving up par value shares (flexibility and simplicity).185 The capital 
protection is however still perceived as a necessary consequence that a 
company may participate in commerce with limited liability. Furthermore, it is 
regarded as indispensable to protect creditors as well as minority shareholders 
against majority shareholders who are inclined to drain capital away from the 
company after incorporation.186 In other words, the American Model which does 
not acknowledge the idea of creditor protection via capital protection rules is not 
adopted in this model. On the contrary, the question is asked whether there is a 
way to modernize and strengthen capital protection rules in Swiss Company Law.  
As already explained above, by introducing the ‘real non par value share’ the 
share capital would necessarily fall away as the methodically simple link for 
capital protection rules.187 Based on the perceived weaknesses of the share 
capital system mentioned below section 2.2., the problem to be solved is how 
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185 Böckli (note 165) at 342. 
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capital protection can be realised without relying on the present reference size 
share capital.  
Whatever size is chosen in order to link the capital protection rules the threefold 
function which must be fulfilled remain the same in this scheme: the principle of 
coverage, the capital maintenance rule and the signal for emergency measures. 
The rules which apply in order to secure the raising of capital and prevent fraud 
on issuance apply unchanged as far as the coverage of the issue prize by 
immediately disposable net assets is concerned. The issue prize upon 
incorporation has henceforth to be fully paid in over the subscribed amount (and 
not only over a reduced amount as presently provided for in Article 632 OR). The 
differentiation between par value and premium does not exist anymore as a 
consequence of the abolishment of the share capital system. The board of 
directors decides over the issue prize with due care which will normally lead it to 
the actual market value.188  
As far as the capital maintenance rule is concerned the reference size ‘share 
capital’ shall henceforth be replaced by ‘capital reserves’ as stated in the last 
audited annual balance sheet. The reference size is automatically increased 
every time capital is brought in effectively. The increase is limited by the 
authorized capital. A diminution of ‘capital reserves’ however is only possible by 
means of a formal capital reduction according to Articles 732 ff. OR. An offsetting 
with realised losses is excluded. The fraction of the annual profit which has 
presently to be allocated to the legal reserves is henceforth allocated to the 
‘capital reserves’ in order to enforce the equity of a company. The possibilities for 
profit distribution are therefore diminished.189 Is the ‘capital reserve’ together with 
liabilities not covered by fairly valued assets all profits generated by the company 
must first and exclusively be used to recover this capital deficiency before 
dividends can be distributed.190  
And finally as far as the ‘warning bell’ function of the share capital is concerned 
emergency measures would have to be initiated by the board of directors not 
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only upon half of the share capital and the legal reserves are no longer covered 
but, upon loss of a third of the total ‘capital reserve’. In bringing forward the 
critical moment to embark on emergency measures to a point in time when the 
need of restructuring measures becomes apparent due to a continuing loss of 
equity, it is hoped to improve the prospects of the ensuing turn around 
measures.191  
The requirement of a minimum capital can be retained in this system but now in 
the form of a minimum ‘capital reserve’.192 Within this scheme ‘real no par value 
shares’ are realized and the share capital is - at least formally - abandoned. 
Capital protection rules are however not only retained but even strengthened. 
The rigid ‘share capital’ is replaced by the flexible ‘capital reserve’. Through the 
extension of the amount which is not available for distribution to shareholders it is 
aimed to make capital protection rules operative again.  
 
(c) According to a third model it is possible to achieve a sufficiently flexible capital 
structure without introducing ‘real no par value share’. This happens foremost by 
enhancing the authority of the board of directors.193 The flexibility of the 
American Model would not principally lay in the abolishment of the share capital 
but in the authority conferred upon the board of directors to issue shares up to 
the amount of the authorized capital. Without this authorization, the capital 
structure would be rigid with or without the existence of ‘real no par value 
shares’.194 This model is not so much concerned with capital protection rules 
even though the decreasing significance of the share capital as a reference size 
with progressing business activity is acknowledged. But this limited economic 
significance of the share capital with increasing maturity of a company serves 
rather as an argument to render it more flexible. Creditor protection should better 
be enforced by allowing companies to integrate voluntarily additional 
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194 von der Crone (note 162) at 11. 
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mechanisms like ratings or financial ratios (for example a minimum equity ratio) 
in their articles of incorporation.195  
It is held that the share capital system as provided for in Swiss Company Law 
does in its rigidity not meet the requirements of modern corporate finance. The 
reason being is that the question on what to invest should usually precede the 
question of how to finance the respective investment. The general meeting of 
shareholders should therefore be free to confer upon the board of directors a 
wide authority over financing decisions parallel to its already existing authority 
over investment decisions. Swiss Company Law however leaves a big say to the 
general meeting of shareholders as far as financing by equity is concerned 
wherefore the financing decision is conceptually made before the decision over 
the investment. 196 Even though share capital has already become more flexible 
during the last reform process in 1991 with the introduction of the authorized 
increase of share capital (Article 651 OR) the aim of a flexible share capital 
structure has only partly been realised. The procedural formalities are still 
extensive. The authority which can be given by the general shareholder meeting 
to the board of directors to increase the share capital is only valid for two years. 
Above all, an analogue procedure for an ‘authorized’ capital reduction is still not 
provided; the board of directors lacks every competence within the capital 
reduction procedure.197  
The proposed model in order to overcome the inflexibility of the share capital in 
Swiss Company Law is the introduction of a ‘capital band’ (‘Kapitalband’):198 a 
company may in its articles of incorporation provide for a ‘capital band’ in lieu of a 
fixed share capital. The capital band is defined by a basis and a maximum 
capital. The basis capital must be raised according to the present provisions on 
incorporation and capital increases. It can only be reduced by obeying the formal 
capital reduction procedure (Articles 732 ff. OR). The basis capital henceforth 
affords the formal security to creditors so far provided by the share capital. But 
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within the capital band it is possible to increase and reduce the share capital by 
following thereby a simplified procedure. The general meeting of shareholders 
can introduce a capital band at every point in time with special resolution 
according to Article 704 OR199 for a maximum of five years. If not renewed after 
this period the share capital as it exists at that moment will become fix.  
Basis capital and maximum capital have to be stated in the articles of 
incorporation. The basis capital must be at least CHF 100’000 and the maximum 
capital may not exceed the basis capital for more than 100%. The introduction of 
‘notional no par value shares’ is welcomed. The increase or the reduction of the 
basis capital will follow the present provisions concerning the ordinary increase 
and reduction of share capital. But within the ‘capital band’ the increase and 
reduction of the share capital is not only depleted of formalities but henceforth in 
the authority of the board of directors. As far as capital reductions are concerned 
the board of directors must indeed make sure that reduced share capital as well 
as the legal reserves is still covered after the capital reduction. But the 
notification to the creditors or their right to ask for the provision of security 
according to Article 733 OR is not applicable anymore.  
This model should on the one hand enable the board of directors to react faster 
and easier to the requirements of adverse conditions and volatile markets and 
provide on the other hand for a balance of interest between the company in a 
flexible share capital structure and the creditors in the protection of the share 
capital.200
2.4. Valuation of the discussed schemes 
The three, above discussed, major approaches within the current reform 
discussion in Swiss doctrine bear on the first sight not many resemblances. An 
agreement exists as far as the abolishment of par value shares is concerned. But 
whether this implicates as well the abandonment of the share capital concept or 
entails only the introduction of the ‘notional no par value’ shares is not uniformly 
                                                 
199 Article 704 OR implies a two third majority of the votes represented and the absolute majority 
of the par value of shares represented. 
200 von der Crone (note 162) at 4. 
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answered. Even the relatively settled opinion that the abolishment of the share 
capital concept would entail the abandonment of the capital maintenance rule is 
contested in the second model.  
The first model appears to be the most advanced. But on a second look it is 
doubtful whether it is really concerned with finding a viable proposal for the 
reform of Swiss company law which is still deeply anchored in the European 
continental law tradition of a systematically closed share capital system. It is 
certainly undisputed that the American Model possesses several advantages 
over the rigid share capital system. It cannot be denied that it is more flexible, 
more solution oriented and less bound to formalities. The weaknesses of the 
capital protection rules especially as an efficient mean of creditor protection are 
perceived by all relevant law authorities. But the weak point of the first model is 
exactly that it is restrained to an explanation of the advantages of the American 
Model over the share capital system without giving a clue of how the 
implementation of a non share capital system could in reality be carried out in 
Swiss Company Law. Its findings are simply that an overall assessment would 
show that the solution oriented approach of the American Model is to be 
preferred over the formalistic share capital system. But where does this 
conclusion lead to? Is it a hidden recommendation to simply adopt the Revised 
Model Business Corporation Act ‘tel quel’ for Swiss Company Law? This can 
obviously not been meant as such an abrupt change would knock out the 
corporate business community in Switzerland. The important question which is 
left unanswered in the model is therefore how to implement the advantages of a 
non share capital concept into a legal system with a completely different legal 
and social background than the American Model. On this level a lot of ‘field 
studies’ and preparation work still need to be done in order to enable the 
legislator to adopt in the future a comparable - but hardly identical - model as 
provided in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act. The first scheme gives 
at best new impulses for such further studies but, remains very vague as to the 
question how the current system should be reformed.  
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Furthermore, even though Switzerland is not yet part of the EU and therefore in 
principle not obliged to follow the guidelines of the Second Company Law 
Directive of 13 December 1976 it is nevertheless worth mentioning that 
introducing such a progressive approach would for the moment be contradictory 
to European Company Law. Should Switzerland join the EU at a later stage it 
could be necessary to readopt the share capital system. It has been vaguely 
argued that for the time being it could however be a competitive advantage for 
Switzerland to adopt a modern approach towards capital rules.201  
The second and third models on the other hand clearly indicate in their 
respective field of priority which way the legislature would have to go in order to 
realize the set objectives as there are: a modernization of capital protection rules 
and a more flexible capital structure. The second model abolishes the share 
capital concept but enforces the capital protection rules linked to the new 
reference size ‘capital reserve’. The third model maintains the share capital 
concept but introduces a ‘capital band’ as well as ‘notional no par value shares’ 
without further regard to capital protection rules. However differently the priorities 
are set within these two models it is not impossible to combine them. A capital 
band as proposed in the third model can be introduced in a non share capital 
system as proposed in the second model in so far as in the articles of 
incorporation it is not only stated how many shares can be issued at maximum 
(authorized capital) but, as well how many shares can be taken back freely (i.e. 
without going through a formal reduction of the ‘capital reserve’).202 The increase 
and reduction of the ‘capital reserve’ within the ‘capital band’ would be in the 
authority of the board of directors. The capital maintenance rule would therefore 
only apply insofar as the number of issued shares would after the reduction fall 
below the minimum amount specified in the articles of incorporation. However, in 
such a system it would be very difficult for creditors to know up to which amount 
the equity is exactly protected against a return to the shareholders since the 
market value of a share may vary from day to day. 
                                                 
201 Stoffel (note 177). 
202 Böckli (note 184) at 733-34. 
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The second and third model might be realizable proposals in order to create a 
more flexible capital concept for Switzerland. But at the same time they are still 
anchored in the share capital concept with all its perceived disadvantages. The 
second model purports to give up the share capital concept but in fact the 
introduced notion ‘capital reserve’ is not more than an aggregation of what are 
presently the payments on nominal value (share capital), the premiums and legal 
reserves. Until now the capital maintenance rule is only targeted at the share 
capital and the legal reserves. Without the differentiation between share capital 
and premium in a non share capital system the entire issue price would become 
subject of the capital maintenance rule. There is no qualitative difference to a 
‘notional non par value share’ system. Capital increases are effected of course 
more easily in this model but, the reason being is not the renaming of ‘share 
capital’ in ‘capital reserve’ but the authority of the board of directors for the issue 
of shares up to the authorized share capital. Such a change in competence can 
be effected even within a traditional share capital system. The second model on 
its own would bring a very modest modernization of the capital system if - as it is 
generally the case - modernization is understood as developing towards the 
American Model. Going into the opposite direction by strengthening the capital 
protection rules (which is in truth the substance of the second model) is in fact an 
alternative model which cannot claim for itself to receive much support in current 
international legal doctrine.  
The third model is the most ‘honest’ in so far as it does not purport to be more of 
a change than it actually is. It clearly indicates how the Swiss Company Law 
should be adapted in order to realize the (even though modest) steps to render 
share capital more flexible. As opposed to the first model the realisation of the 
well elaborated third model within the nearer future is a realistic scenario. Of 
course the share capital system is preserved since the model is limited to the 
introduction of the ‘notional no par value share’. The introduction of the ‘capital 
band’ provides more flexibility not by abolishing the share capital structure but by 
giving the board of directors the authority within the ‘capital band’ to increase and 
reduce the share capital and at the same time depleting the respective 
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procedures of some of the most burdensome formalities. The third model is by no 
means revolutionary if a convergence with the American Model is defined as the 
desirable end result of a modernization of capital structures. However, it is a 
realistic step in order to accustom the corporate legal community to a broadened 
authority of the board of directors thereby departing from the almighty principle of 
supremacy of the general meeting of shareholders which is still omnipresent in 
Swiss Company Law.  
2.5. Reform steps undertaken 
The most important major reform process of Swiss Company Law took place 
between 1968 and 1991. This is even for a country where the mills of the 
legislator traditionally grind slowly a record-breaking period of time.203 The first 
parliamentary petitions in order to revise the Company Law have already been 
submitted in 1957 when two members of the parliament required the introduction 
of shares with a smaller or even no par value in order to make it possible for a 
broader part of the population to acquire shares and to provide new financial 
funds for the increasing demand of financial means in the economy. The Federal 
Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) established a research group in 1959 in 
order to identify the need for no par value shares or at least par value shares with 
a smaller nominal value.204 The conclusion of the research group published in a 
special edition of the DEA monthly magazine Volkswirtschaft was that the 
introduction of ‘real no par value shares’ would make sense in principle but that 
the achieved advantages would be modest in comparison with the 
comprehensiveness of the law reform thereby needed. The necessity was not 
perceived as such to justify the otherwise indispensable initiation of a more 
fundamental research work on the subject.205 This negative approach was 
adopted in the following by the working committees established by the Federal 
Department of Justice and Police (FDJP) in order to prepare the law reform and 
                                                 
203 P Forstmoser ’Alter Wein in neuen Schläuchen?’ (1992) 111 ZSR 1 at 3-4. 
204 The Swiss Federal Council ’Botschaft über die Revision des Aktienrechts vom 23. Februar 
1983’ BBl 1983 745 at 772. 
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vom Eidg. Volkswirtschaftsdepartement eingesetzten Studiengruppe’ special edition 69 of the 
periodical Volkswirtschaft (Bern: DEA, 1961) 20; von der Crone (note 162) at 3. 
 62
the subject consequently was not further investigated.206 The reform process was 
completed in 1991 and became legally effective on 1st July 1992.  
The principal thrusts of this reform - as far as the concern for the present 
assignment - were a facilitation of capital procurement, an enforcement of the 
capital protection and the principal permission - under certain restrictions - of 
share buy backs:  
- The facilitation in capital procurement was achieved by simplifying the 
ordinary share capital increase procedure207, by introducing the authorized 
increase of capital208 as well as the capital increase subject to a 
condition209 and by simplifying the financial reorganization process of a 
company.210 In compliance with the recommendations of the reform 
commissions and despite the negative approach of the federal council of 
Switzerland211 the minimum par value of a share was furthermore reduced 
from CHF 100 to CHF 10. 
- The accentuation of capital protection was realized firstly by an increase of 
the minimum share capital from CHF 50’000 to CHF 100’000 of which at 
least CHF 50’000 must be paid in on incorporation of the company. 
Secondly, the required formalities on raising of share capital were 
tightened as far as contributions in kind and acquisitions of assets were 
concerned through the introduction of an examination of the founders’ 
report and an examination of the report of capital increase by an auditor 
(cp. Articles 635a and 652f OR). The founders report for example contains 
apart from others a written account for the nature and condition of 
contributions in kind or acquisitions of assets and the adequacy of their 
                                                 
206 The Swiss Federal Council (note 204) at 787. 
207 The board of directors has received more authority in carrying out share capital increases 
upon the resolution of the general meeting of shareholders. 
208 Cp. note 180. 
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210 The Swiss Federal Council (note 204) at 770-71. 
211 The Swiss Federal Council (note 204) at 786. 
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valuation. The auditor must in the following examine this report and 
confirm in writing its completeness and accuracy.212  
- Share buy backs, until then prohibited with certain exceptions, were now 
allowed within the following strict limits: the total par value of treasury 
shares may not exceed 10% of the share capital and the acquisition must 
be effected through freely disposable equity over the necessary amount. 
Furthermore an amount corresponding to the acquisition value must be 
allocated to legal reserves designated as reserves for own shares.213 
Since then the only reform worth mentioning in relation to the subject of this 
assignment is the further reduction of the minimum par value of a share from 
CHF 10 to 1 cent coming into force on 1st May 2001. The main reasons brought 
forward for this amendment were that a smaller par value would provide a higher 
liquidity of the respective shares and were more likely to attract Anglo-Saxon 
investors who generally are critical towards high nominal values. Additionally, 
problems of arithmetic nature in the course of mergers, demergers and 
restructuring procedures could be eliminated and stock option plans for 
employees facilitated.214  
2.6. Reform steps to be expected 
The three major models which are currently discussed in Swiss corporate 
doctrine have already been discussed in section 2.3. From the official side, a 
reform process was initiated in the beginning of 2001. As far as the present topic 
is concerned the Federal Office of Justice has - based on two parliamentary 
petitions of the Commission for Economy and Duties in later 2000 - mandated 
Professor Hans Caspar von der Crone of the University of Zurich on 4 May 2001 
to draw up an expert opinion concerning amongst others the question how to 
render capital structures in companies more flexible and whether thereby 
‘notional’ or ‘real no par value shares’ should be adopted in Swiss Company 
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213 The Swiss Federal Council (note 204) at 805 ff.. 
214 Böckli (note 165) at 334. 
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Law.215 The report of Professer von der Crone to the Federal Office was 
publicized in the Swiss law magazine REPRAX in 2002216 and represents the 
third model as discussed in section 2.3. (c).  
The draft legislation on the company law reform is written but not yet approved 
by the entire Federal Council of Switzerland. This decision necessary to open the 
consultation procedure and thereby make the draft publicly available can - 
according to an oral statement of the officially responsible person in the Federal 
Office of Justice - not be expected before December 2005. And the consultation 
procedure thereafter can easily again take as long as two years. The Federal 
Council has set itself the target to report its final comments (‘Botschaft’) to the 
revised draft by the end of the legislative period (December 2007). After that, the 
revised draft is still to be presented to the parliament where the discussions  
could again take years before an affirmative decision within both chambers217 
can be achieved.  
Even though the draft legislation is not yet public one must not be too 
adventurous in predicting that the main features of the third model as discussed 
in 2.3 (c) will be a substantial part thereof. On the one hand the Federal Office of 
Justice has not solicited further expert reports in the field of capital structures and 
on the other hand no viable models are yet developed in doctrine to totally 
replace the share capital system in Switzerland. Therefore, the ‘notional no par 
value share’ as well as the ‘capital band’ can certainly be expected to be most 
certainly integrated in the draft legislation. The capital band will presumably 
consist - as delineated in the third model - of a basis capital and a maximum 
capital and the board of directors will receive authority to effect deliberately 
between these two benchmarks share capital increases and reductions by 
obeying thereby a simplified and accelerated procedure.218 More advanced 
proposals are not to be expected and even these relatively moderate steps to 
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increase the flexibility of the share capital structure will - as discussed above - 
still take years to become legal reality.  
3. Legal situation in EU 
3.1. Capital maintenance rule 
The harmonization programme for Company Law within the EU which started in 
the early 1960’s has been ambitious and to a great extent successful. The 
harmonization power of the EU is broad within the field of company law since it is 
generally acknowledged as an important aspect in realizing the principal goal of a 
common market within the EU.219 European Company Law is mostly contained in 
directives, i.e. subordinate legislation which is based on the Treaties of the EU. 
Directives are not directly applicable but addressed to the Member States who 
have to implement them into their national legal order. The choice of this legal 
instrument enabled the Member States to compromise on common principles 
rather than on precise wordings which was easier, given the fact that the 
legislative traditions differed quite considerably within the Member States.220 
Today, a largely identical body of company law has developed within the Member 
States and many provisions implementing directives show almost identical terms. 
However, it must be kept in mind that European Company Law is still not a 
uniform law and harmonization remains partial.221 Directives offer sometimes 
more than one alternative to reach the desired result or leave it up to the Member 
States to go beyond the minimum standards set by the directives.  
In the present context the Second Company Law Directive of 13 December 1976 
(Second Directive), adopted under Article 54 of the EC Treaty, on coordination of 
safeguards in respect of the formation of public limited liability companies and the 
maintenance and alteration of their capital is of importance. The stated aim of the 
Second Directive is to deliver interested persons with information about the 
composition of a company’s capital and to ensure a minimum standard for 
                                                 
219 E Wymeersch ‘Company Law in Europe and European Company Law’ (April 2001) Financial 
Law Institute Working Paper No. 2001-06 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=273876 (accessed 
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shareholder and creditor protection. The system provided by the Second 
Directive in order to realise these objectives is very similar to the one governing 
Swiss Company Law. It adheres to the share capital concept and the thereto 
attached capital protection rules. 
The following requirements are set by the Second Directive in respect of public 
companies and are to be implemented into the national company law by each 
member state: The statutes or another instrument of incorporation must state the 
subscribed capital, the nominal value of the shares subscribed or the number of 
shares subscribed without stating the nominal value where such shares may be 
issued under national law (Article 3). European legal doctrine largely agrees that 
this provision permits the Member States to introduce the ‘notional no par value 
share’ but not the ‘real no par value share’.222 Shares might not be issued at a 
price lower than their nominal value or - where there is no nominal value - their 
accountable par (Article 8). The minimum capital required is EURO 25’000 
(Article 6). On incorporation each share must be paid up at not less than 25% of 
its nominal value (or accountable par) (Article 9). The subscribed capital can only 
consist of assets which are capable of economic assessment, but in any case not 
of an undertaking to perform work or supply services (Article 7).  
Article 15 (a) and (c) are of distinguished interest as the capital maintenance rule 
is explicitly stated therein: “Except for cases of reductions of subscribed capital, 
no distribution to shareholders may be made when on the closing date of the last 
financial year the net assets as set out in the company’s annual accounts are, or 
following such a distribution would become, lower than the amount of the 
subscribed capital plus those reserves which may not be distributed under the 
law or the statutes” and “The amount of a distribution to shareholders may not 
exceed the amount of the profits at the end of the last financial year plus any 
profits brought forward and sums drawn from reserves available for this purpose, 
less any losses brought forward and sums placed to reserve in accordance with 
the law or the statutes.”  
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Furthermore, share buy backs may - apart from other restrictions - not exceed 
10% of the subscribed capital and may not have the effect of reducing the net 
assets below the amount of the subscribed capital plus the non distributable 
reserves (Article 19). Financial assistance by a company to a third party for the 
purchase of its own shares is in principle prohibited (Article 23). Both increase 
and reduction of share capital (Article 25 and 30) must be decided by the general 
meeting of shareholders. As far as share capital increases are concerned the 
board of directors can - subject to certain conditions - at least be authorized by 
the general meeting of shareholders to increase the subscribed capital up to a 
maximum amount (fixed by national law) and within a period of maximum five 
years (Article 25). A capital reduction may not fall below the required minimum 
capital (Article 34). Creditors are entitled to obtain security for due claims upon 
the publication of a capital reduction (Article 32). And in the case of a serious 
loss of the subscribed capital a general meeting of shareholders is to be called 
which must consider emergency measures to be taken. The amount of a loss 
deemed to be ‘serious’ may not be set by Member States at a figure higher than 
half the subscribed capital (Article 17). 
European Company Law and Swiss Company Law are therefore very similar as 
far as the share capital concept and capital protection rules are concerned. The 
directive discussed above was enacted nearly 30 years ago and has since then 
remained unchanged. However, discussions about a fundamental overhaul of 
capital rules have also lately started in the EU and a first - even though by no 
means radical - reform proposal concerning the Second Directive has already 
been presented by the European Commission. These short and medium term 
reform ambitions are the subject of the next two chapters. 
3.2. Reform steps to be expected (short term) 
The Commission launched in 1998 a law reform program called the Simplification 
of the Legislation on the Internal Market (SLIM). Within this process a Company 
Law Working Group issued in September 1999 a Report with recommendations 
on the areas in which a simplification of the First and Second Company Law 
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Directives could be achieved.223 In September 2001 the Commission set up the 
High Level Group of Company Law Experts (‘High Level Group’) which further 
developed the recommendations of the Working Group.224 Following an 
extended public consultation which it held on possible approaches towards a 
reform of the European capital regime the High Level Group issued a ‘Report on 
a Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe’ (‘Report’)225 in 
which - amongst others - it supplemented the recommendations of the Working 
Group slightly (‘SLIM-Plus’). Based thereupon the Commission has developed its 
proposal for a new directive aimed at the amendment of the Second Directive as 
a first and most urgent step within the broad-based Commission’s Action Plan on 
Company Law and Corporate Governance launched in May 2003.226 The 
proposal has being discussed in Council working groups and is currently being 
considered by the European Parliament.  
The objectives of this amendment are to facilitate capital related measures taken 
in public companies and thereby contribute to the efficiency and competitiveness 
of European business.227 Certain capital measures in reaction to market 
developments should be possible in a less costly and protracted manner by 
maintaining at the same time the similar standard of creditor and shareholder 
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protection.228 The proposed changes in order to reach such ambitious aims are 
however not of fundamental nature: the need for expert valuation of contributions 
in kind upon incorporation or share capital increases will be abolished in cases 
where there is a clear point of reference for the valuation of such consideration, 
financial assistance provided by a company for the acquisition of its shares by a 
third party will - subject to certain safeguards - be allowed up to the limit of the 
company’s distributable reserves, the procedure of share capital increases will 
become less burdensome by relaxing the current rules on the limitation or 
withdrawal of pre-emption rights and the right for a company to acquire its own 
shares up to the limits of distributable reserves will be introduced.229  
3.3. Reform steps to be expected (medium term) 
But the Commission’s Action Plan on Company Law and Corporate Governance 
also includes a medium-term strategy to reconsider an alternative concept to the 
share capital system.230 The share capital system as one of the cornerstones of 
European Company Law was recently openly challenged by the High Level 
Group: apart from supplementing the proposals of the SLIM Working Group 
foremost directed at rendering the Second Directive simpler and more efficient it 
furthermore presented two alternative models which would abandon the legal 
capital concept. After the implementation of such an alternative system the High 
Level Group is of the opinion that the Member States should be able to freely 
decide whether to change to this new regime or to retain the system as provided 
in the Second Directive.231 This despite the fact that the High Level Group 
expressed severe criticism towards the current share capital system: the legal 
capital would give no indication whether the company’s assets are sufficient for 
its entrepreneurial activity and would fall short in reaching its principal goals 
which are creditor and shareholder protection. Creditors would only be interested 
in the question whether or not a company is able to pay its debts and to answer 
this question the share capital would only give a very primitive and inaccurate 
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indication. The inflexibility of the current system would furthermore have a 
negative impact on the cost and efficiency of equity funding.232  
These weak points of the current system have led the High Level Group to 
consider alternative models and to conduct an extensive consultation process 
within the interested European corporate community which has received a wide 
response. It emerged however that a radical change based on the American 
Model could not find much favour. A second alternative model outlined by the 
High Level Group which also departs from a non share capital concept but which, 
at the same time, retains some basic features of the European Company Law 
received a much more positive feedback. This model aims at integrating modern, 
more efficient mechanisms for creditor protection into the European style of 
company where the power in relation to operations concerning shareholders’ 
equity is with the general shareholder meeting.233  
In its Report the High Level Group delineated the major characteristics of how 
such a new regime could look like: A solvency test for any distributions to 
shareholders (including share buy-backs and capital reductions) would be 
introduced. The solvency test would be twofold; it would contain a balance sheet 
test (the assets must fully cover or exceed liabilities after the proposed 
distribution) and a liquidity test (the company must have sufficient liquid assets to 
make payments of the liabilities as they fall due in the following period, e.g. the 
forthcoming twelve months). Furthermore the requirement to retain a certain 
solvency margin on a continuing basis should be evaluated. The fulfilment of the 
solvency test should be explicitly confirmed by the board of directors and they 
would become liable for the incorrectness of such a certificate. Exclusion or 
limitation of pre-emption rights would in principle still only be possible, based on 
a resolution of the general shareholder meeting. Shares could henceforth only be 
issued at a fair value which necessarily would have to stand in a relation to the 
real value of the existing shares. The protection of shareholders would thereby 
normally be improved compared to the present requirement not to issue shares 
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below par value. Shares which are issued for contributions in kind could be made 
subject to a respective resolution of the general shareholder meeting and 
directors could be required to certify the appropriateness of the consideration in 
the light of the fair value of the existing shares.234  
The model presented by the High Level Group is not yet fully fledged and needs 
some further refinement. A public consultation on the Commission Action Plan 
has in fact shown that a further study into the feasibility of an alternative to the 
share capital system is largely welcomed. But round about half of the 
respondents have harshly criticized the possible introduction of an alternative 
regime: such a radical change of system even at a later stage would result in a 
loss of transparency and creditor protection. Furthermore, the alternative 
introduction of a completely different concept would endanger the harmonisation 
so far achieved within the EU and introduce an unwelcome division of law.235
The Commission has however called for tenders until 26 September 2005 to 
draw up a feasibility study concerning alternatives to the current share capital 
regime.236 The study should evaluate whether within an alternative regime an 
equal standard of creditor and shareholder protection could be achieved by 
enhancing at the same time efficiency and competitiveness of business. The final 
report is expected at the end of 2006.  
3.4. Excursus: Legal situation in GB 
In the context of the present assignment the position of Great Britain is of 
particular interest. On the one hand Great Britain is a member of the EU and 
therefore subject to the limitations set by the legislation of the EU. On the other 
hand it is a common law country where company law is guided by completely 
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different principles and traditions than that of the major part of other member 
countries. Together with Ireland, Great Britain forms a small minority of common 
law nations within the EU what is highly unfortunate within any decision-making 
body.237 Reform in Great Britain as far as company law is concerned had in the 
past four decades mainly been limited to the implementation of EC directives. 
Unlike in most of the other common law countries the capital maintenance rule 
was even strengthened in English company law.238 A harmonization with 
continental law systems has taken place and consequently an alienation from 
other common law systems. Other common law countries like Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada and South Africa who once looked to Great Britain to lead the 
way have already modernized their law in the course of the revised American 
Model Business Corporation Act. It is therefore not surprising that the English 
influence on common law has decreased considerably within Company Law in 
the past three decades.239 Critical voices within the country considered this 
assimilation of continental company law principles as contradictory to the 
business needs and commercial values as they have materialized in recent 
years.240 Great Britain should be more vigilant henceforth to use all its possible 
influence within the EU to shape the terms of the future agenda according to their 
comprehension of modern business needs instead of trying to influence detailed 
proposals once the program has already been made.241  
The need for a fundamental review of the British company law was strongly 
perceived within the British corporate community and the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI) has in reaction thereto launched a long-term program in 
March 1998 with the aim “to develop a simple, modern, efficient and cost 
                                                 
237 LS Sealy Company Law and Commercial Reality (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984) 83. 
238 JT Pretorius/PA Delport/M Havenga/M Vermaas Hahlo’s South African Company Law through 
cases 5ed (Cape Town: Juta & Co., 1991) 170. 
239 BL Welling Corporate Law in Canada - the Governing Principles 2ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 
1991) 38. 
240 Sealy (note 237) at 75. 
241 Sealy (note 237) at 82-84; Department of Trade and Industry ‘Promoting Competitiveness: 
The UK approach to EU company law and corporate governance’ available at 




effective framework for carrying out business activity in Britain …”.242 The 
Company Law Review was led by an independent Steering Group consisting of 
persons with particular knowledge and expertise in company law matters. The 
Final Report was presented to the Secretary of State in 2001.243 In March 2005 
the Government published a White Paper244 in which most of the 
recommendations of the Final Report were included. The White Paper was 
subject to consultation until 10 June 2005. Currently the responses are being 
evaluated.245 The reforms will be introduced through the Company Law Reform 
Bill as soon as Parliamentary time allows.246 
A key issue of the reform was the deregulation of the capital maintenance 
regime. As far as public companies are concerned the reform ambitions were 
constrained by the Second Directive.247  The fact that the Second Directive does 
indirectly prohibit the introduction of ‘real no par value shares’ and does only in 
very limited cases allow the provision of financial assistance by a company for 
the acquisition of its own shares by a third party was perceived as especially 
burdensome.248 Consequently the deregulation will predominantly (but not only) 
take place in respect of private companies which are not subject of the Second 
Directive. The planned relaxation of the capital maintenance rule includes the 
following measures: abolishing the restrictions on financial assistance for the 
acquisition of a company’s own shares in respect of private companies, the 
elimination of authorized share capital (no ceiling must be included anymore in 
companies’ constitutions of the number of shares which might be issued) and 
reserve capital, the application of the share premium account will be limited, 
private companies can carry out capital reductions by a solvency statement of 
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the directors instead of a Court order, private companies are dispensed from 
shareholder authorization to allot shares provided that after the issue the 
company will have not more than one class of shares and finally no authorization 
for capital reductions or share buy-backs are required anymore in the articles of 
companies.249  
Given the constraints which Great Britain was confronted within its reform 
program it is not surprising that the current reform ambitions of the EU, especially 
the Action Plan of the Commission, are very much welcome.250  Depending on the 
outcome of the feasibility study currently in progress, an alternative to the current 
capital maintenance regime does not seem out of reach anymore. The DTI has 
furthermore taken seriously the above mentioned criticism to mark its presence 
earlier and tries to involve British stakeholders in the development of the Action 
plan with the recent publication Promoting Competitiveness: the UK approach to 
EU company law and corporate governance.251 This booklet is a serious attempt 
to motivate the British corporate community to take actively part in the process of 
lobbying not only with the EU institutions but, also with the relevant Committees, 
decision makers and business organizations in other Member States. Great 
Britain has accepted that what the EU does on company law is not only of 
fundamental importance for UK companies and investors but above all for its own 
scope for reform. 
4. South Africa: a role model for Switzerland? 
As discussed in the first part of this assignment South Africa has largely given up 
the capital maintenance rule by retaining at the same time the share capital 
concept. It has been criticized that the Companies Amendment Act of 1999 
shows a lack of consequence as not every provision upholding or derived from 
the capital maintenance rule has been properly adapted to the new concept 
‘solvency and liquidity test’. It has been further argued that the share capital 
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concept might as well been given up by the Companies Amendment Act 1999 
since the residual meaning of the capital accounts is now - if anything - very 
restricted. The share capital has forfeited its former function as reference size for 
the capital protection provisions and stands now as a rather awkward shell in the 
revised Companies Act 1973. The overall impression one gets from the actual 
version of the Companies Act is not that South Africa chose deliberately a middle 
way but, that the result is rather a consequence of the hastened and deficient 
reform process. The stated aim of the reform process which is currently taking 
place in South Africa is therefore foremost to do away with these insufficiencies. 
The result which can be expected will most certainly rely heavily on the American 
Model. But for the time being, the question whether South African Company Law 
(in its present status) could serve as a role model for Swiss Company Law must - 
due to the inconsistent conversion into the chosen model - be answered in the 
negative.  
After the current reform process will be completed in South Africa the question 
might as well be reformulated in whether the American Model could serve as well 
as a role model for Swiss Company Law. In Switzerland as well as in the EU the 
current reform ambitions to relax the capital maintenance rule are indeed clearly 
influenced by the perceived advantages which are anchored in the non share 
capital system as developed by the American Model. But both in Switzerland as 
well as in the EU skepticism is still discernible when it comes to the ultimate 
question whether the capital maintenance regime should be totally abolished. As 
shown above, the share capital concept as a coherent and close system is still 
partly perceived as affording a minimal creditor and shareholder protection. An 
alternative regime would only have a chance if it is assured that it guarantees at 
least an equal standard of such safeguards. Concerns of this nature are 
addressed completely different and to a lesser degree normative within the 
American Model where creditors as well as minority shareholders are in principle 
expected to provide for their own protection through negotiated agreements. 
Even though the major part of the Continental European legal community 
perceives the same weaknesses of the current share capital system the 
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proposed solutions vary considerably when it comes to the question how these 
weaknesses should be overcome. An alternative model which would allow 
replacing more or less smoothly the current share capital system in Continental 
Europe seems not yet operational, wherefore the EU is about to commission a 
respective feasibility study. For Switzerland it is at the moment certainly rational 
and cost-effective to wait for the outcome of this feasibility study before taking 
into consideration a major departure from the existing harmony. This even more 
so as Switzerland has approached the EU in the last years significantly through 
bilateral agreements and a later joining as a full member state is not excluded.  
From a middle to long term perspective, the share capital system in Europe will 
not only be rendered more flexible but most certainly replaced by a new concept. 
Such a concept will by all means be inspired by the advantages of the American 
Model. A plain adoption of the American Model in the EU or in Switzerland is 
however unrealistic and a convergence of the two systems is restricted since a 
European concept - to be acceptable to a majority - will in principle still have to 
provide for the supremacy of the general shareholder meeting over the board of 
directors.  
5. Revised Model Business Corporation Act:  
a role model for South Africa? 
The progression of the current reform ambitions in South Africa leaves no doubt 
about this question: Members of the American Bar Association have been closely 
involved in the reform process from the start and the recommendations of their 
Report in respect of the capital structure have been integrated in the Guidelines 
almost verbatim.252 Of course there is some further consultation planned but it 
seems very likely that the end result as far as capital rules are concerned will be 
based upon the American Model. Already the Companies Amendment Act 1999 
has - at least indirectly - been inspired by the American Model in so far as it 
borrowed heavily from the Canada Business Corporations Act 1985 which on its 
part is influenced by the American predecessor. The approach in the current 
                                                 
252 cp. section 1.6.. 
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reform procedure is therefore not new; it is aimed to complete and harmonize the 
Companies Act in conformance with the underlying paradigm shift induced 
already by the Companies Amendment Act in 1999.   
The heavy influence of the recommendations of the American Bar Association on 
the Guidelines has not, of course, remained unnoticed and has been criticized as 
problematic during the current consultation process.253 It has been held that the 
focus would be wrongly chosen if the need to bring South African Company Law 
in line with international trends would take precedence over the requirement to 
adapt the new legislation to “the legal, economic and social context of South 
Africa”.254 Values which are special in the context of South Africa like the need 
for social sustainability would be neglected by putting to strong an emphasis on 
efficiency.255  
These reflections are certainly justified as general remarks and there would have 
certainly been more diplomatic ways to implement the recommendations of the 
American Bar Association than to more or less copy them into the Guidelines. 
But as far as capital rules are concerned such criticism lacks tangible substance 
since the choice of a capital concept is a highly technical and largely non-political 
question. Capital rules are simply not suitable to integrate social value 
considerations in the sense like the new Constitution of South Africa upholds 
them. The capital concept in the Companies Act, especially the abolishment of 
the capital maintenance rule, needs undoubtedly further refinement and 
perfection which has in essentially the same terms been brought forward by 
South African law authorities even before the American Bar Association was 
involved.256 There are not so many different ways to achieve these aims and it 
seems not altogether unreasonable to attach a special value to reflections 
expressed by persons who are most familiar with the ultimate source of the 
model chosen by South Africa. 
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6. Summary 
The tendency in all of the three discussed company law systems (South Africa, 
Switzerland, European Union) is manifest: the share capital structure will be 
rendered more flexible in short term and is likely to be abolished in the middle to 
long run. The development in all three countries is thereby influenced by the 
perceived advantages of the American Model even though to a different degree: 
Where in the EU as well as in Switzerland scepticism can still be perceived 
towards a non share capital system in which creditor and shareholder protection 
would not anymore be linked to a bar figure South Africa is currently considering 
to converge further with the American Model not only in respect of the consistent 
application of the solvency and liquidity test - replacing thereby the capital 
maintenance rule - but as well in respect of the complete abolishment of the par 
value and stated capital concept.  
In Switzerland it can be expected that the current reform process will bring a 
certain relaxation of the share capital rules as well as a slight decrease of the 
supremacy of the general shareholder meeting with the introduction of the capital 
band. Furthermore, ‘notional no par value shares’ will most certainly be 
introduced. Before taking off to more adventurous reform steps Switzerland will 
carefully watch the developments in the EU, especially the outcome of the 
feasibility study in respect of alternatives to the share capital regime.  
The EU will according to the Commission’s Action Plan on Company Law and 
Corporate Governance modernize its Second Company Law Directive. The 
proposals in order to facilitate capital related measures in companies are thereby 
still relatively modest but can be expected to materialize in short term. A more 
resolute step, the abolishment of the share capital concept, is currently subject of 
a feasibility study. The introduction of an alternative capital concept is strongly 
lobbied by Great Britain as one of the two only common law countries within the 
EU.  
However different the opinions in relation to an alternative capital concept in the 
examined jurisdictions might be, on one point seems to be agreement: the 
prototype of the continental European share capital system is outdated. Its 
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stringent formalism and comprehensiveness has become an end in itself without 
serving its original purpose of shareholder and creditor protection sufficiently. 
Whichever way chosen to reform the capital concepts the pursued objective will 
be identical: capital measures in reaction to market developments must be 
possible in a less costly and in a swifter manner in order to contribute to the 
efficiency and competitiveness of business by maintaining at the same time 
sufficient safeguards for shareholder and creditor interests.  
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